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Frog Eyes and Pig Butts: The North Carolina Stalking Statute’s
Constitutional Dilemma and How To Remedy It *
In State v. Mazur, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the state’s
felony stalking statute created a constitutional prohibition on criminal conduct
and did not implicate any protected speech. Only months later, a different panel
of the same court, in State v. Shackelford, held that the statute actually created
a content-based restriction that unconstitutionally infringed on the defendant’s
First Amendment rights. These conflicting analyses did not rest on the factual
differences between the two cases, although there were many. Rather, the
disparity arose from how the two panels applied existing First Amendment
jurisprudence. The conflicting applications highlight the First Amendment
dilemma presented by stalking statutes, a dilemma that this Comment attempts
to solve.
Stalking statutes must balance two competing interests. On the one hand,
stalking is a serious problem, causing significant physical, financial, and
emotional harm to victims. One of the primary ways stalkers inflict these harms
is through sending harassing messages. Thus, victims need laws that can protect
them from harassing communications by stalkers. However, when taken too far,
stalking laws can reach beyond harassing communications and start to infringe
on the constitutionally protected speech of defendants. Therefore, to survive
constitutional challenge, stalking statutes must be broad enough to protect victims
yet narrow enough to leave defendants’ First Amendment rights uninfringed.
To solve this dilemma, this Comment uses the Mazur and Shackelford
decisions to illustrate why North Carolina’s current stalking statute creates a
content-based restriction that requires strict scrutiny. But rather than dooming
stalking statutes, this Comment argues that strict scrutiny is actually the
appropriate vehicle for balancing the competing interests of victims and
defendants. Because stalking communications lie at the intersection of three areas
of less protected speech—unwanted one-to-one speech, speech that invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and speech that inflicts substantial emotional
distress—a stalking statute limited by these three criteria should survive strict
scrutiny. Not only would this statute advance the compelling state interests of
safety and security, but it would also be narrowly tailored by three different lines
of First Amendment jurisprudence.

* © 2021 Nathan W. Wilson.
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Stalking remains a serious problem in the United States. To address it,
legislatures cannot pass overly broad statutes that lend themselves to
misapplication and facial challenges. Instead, this Comment offers a proposed
provision that strikes a balance between competing interests and complies with
existing precedent. In doing so, it hopes to provide a model for legislatures and
courts to follow when wrestling with the constitutional dilemma posed by
stalking statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 2018, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided that
the First Amendment does not protect yard decorations that harass one’s
neighbor. 1 Five months later, a different panel of the same court held that when
the harassment originates from social media posts, First Amendment
protections apply. 2 Why the different treatment? It was not because one case
involved yard decorations and the other social media posts. Rather, the
difference arose from how the panels applied First Amendment jurisprudence
to North Carolina’s felony stalking statute. 3 In doing so, their decisions
highlighted the dilemma caused by broadly worded stalking statutes like North
Carolina’s—a dilemma that thrives within the ambiguity of current free-speech
precedent.
In the yard decoration case, State v. Mazur, 4 the court found that North
Carolina’s stalking statute contained a constitutional prohibition of criminal
conduct, not speech. 5 In contrast, in the social media case, State v. Shackelford, 6
the court found that the statute regulated speech and created a content-based
restriction. 7 This disagreement—whether the stalking statute regulated conduct
1. State v. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. 538, 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *1 (2018)
(unpublished table decision).
2. State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 560, 825 S.E.2d 689, 701 (2019).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277A (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of
the Gen. Assemb.).
4. 261 N.C. App. 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 2018 WL 4440576 (2018) (unpublished table decision).
5. Id. at 538, 817 S.E. 2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *7.
6. 264 N.C. App. 542, 825 S.E.2d 689 (2019).
7. Id. at 558, 825 S.E.2d at 699.
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or speech—is the crux of a constitutional dilemma that has puzzled courts and
commentators alike for decades. 8
Stalking laws exist to promote a positive societal outcome: the prevention
of physical and emotional harm. 9 Before the enactment of these statutes,
victims possessed few legal remedies to protect themselves from stalkers until
after the aggressor had already caused harm. 10 Recognizing the need for more
proactive legislation, state legislatures began passing laws prohibiting stalking. 11
By 1995, all fifty states as well as the District of Columbia enacted some sort of
criminal stalking statute. 12
While these statutes contained prohibitions on following victims around,
they also included provisions banning harassing communications between the
stalker and the victim. 13 Such provisions greatly benefited victims since
“[s]ending persistent, unwanted, or inappropriate gifts, letters, notes, emails,

8. See, e.g., In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 855–56 (Minn. 2019) (finding that
Minnesota’s stalking statute was facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment); Scott v.
State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 669–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), abrogated by Wilson v. State, 448 S.W.3d 418,
422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (abrogating the case on other grounds, but also finding that Texas’s
stalking statute did not “implicate the free-speech guarantee of the First Amendment,” as well as
reaffirming Scott’s First Amendment holding); Parisi v. Mazzaferro, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574, 585–86
(2016) (finding that an injunction prohibiting the defendant from publishing statements intended to
harass a victim who had taken a restraining order out against defendant violated the First Amendment);
see also Chan v. Ellis, 770 S.E.2d 851, 853 n.2 (Ga. 2015) (finding that appellate jurisdiction existed to
examine whether posting on social media violated Georgia’s stalking law but ultimately resolving the
case on other grounds).
9. See State v. Ruesch, 571 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that stalking statutes
“serve[] significant and substantial state interests by providing law enforcement officials with a means
of intervention in potentially dangerous situations before actual violence occurs, and it enables citizens
to protect themselves from recurring intimidation, fear-provoking conduct and physical violence”
(footnote omitted)); see also Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 781, 793–94 (2013) (explaining the reasons for stalking statutes by focusing specifically on their
development in California); Ashley N.B. Beagle, Comment, Modern Stalking Laws: A Survey of State
Anti-Stalking Statutes Considering Modern Mediums and Constitutional Challenges, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 457,
466–69 (2011) (detailing the development of stalking statutes including the reasons for their
enactment); Suzanne L. Karbarz, Note, The First Amendment Implications of Anti-Stalking Statutes, 21 J.
LEGIS. 333, 334–37 (1995) (describing the history and purpose of stalking statutes).
10. See Wayne E. Bradburn, Jr., Comment, Stalking Statutes: An Ineffective Legislative Remedy for
Rectifying Perceived Problems with Today’s Injunction System, 19 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 271, 272–83
(1992) (detailing the shortcomings of legal remedies for stalking victims prior to the passage of stalking
statutes); Karbarz, supra note 9, at 335 (“[S]talking legislation arose due to the inability of existing legal
remedies to protect the victims from their stalkers.”); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.046(2) (Westlaw
through Ch. 184 (End) of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis.) (providing a cause of action for
only those who are a victim of “repeat violence”).
11. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277A (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
12. See Joseph C. Merschman, Note, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for
Contemporary Legislation, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 255, 266 (2001).
13. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A(b)(1) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the
2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
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texts, or social media messages” is one of the most common forms of stalking. 14
Accordingly, prosecutors needed these provisions to protect victims from the
full range of stalking behavior.
However, the provisions also contained a restriction on speech,
implicating the First Amendment. 15 As time passed, defendants began to bring
First Amendment challenges against stalking statutes via affirmative defenses,
albeit with varying degrees of success. 16 The strengths and weaknesses of their
arguments are highlighted in Mazur and Shackelford, where two panels of the
same court looked at the same issue—whether the statute created a contentbased restriction or regulated criminal conduct—and reached opposite
outcomes. Ultimately, these two North Carolina decisions highlight the great
dilemma legislatures face when they attempt to pass stalking statutes that will
survive constitutional scrutiny: How can a state provide robust protection for
stalking victims while ensuring that no defendant’s First Amendment rights are
violated? 17
14. Brianne Sandorf, Signs of a Stalker: Are You Being Followed?, ASECURELIFE (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.asecurelife.com/signs-of-a-stalker/ [https://perma.cc/YMM2-93UX].
15. See Karbarz, supra note 9, at 333–34, 333 n.8 (noting prominent First Amendment critiques
of stalking statutes); Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46
VAND. L. REV. 991, 993 (1993) (describing First Amendment problems with stalking statutes, though
noting that no appellate court had yet considered a constitutional challenge).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 854–56 (8th Cir. 2012) (denying defendant’s
First Amendment challenge because the Eighth Circuit found that the federal interstate stalking statute
was constitutional both on its face and as applied); In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 855–56
(Minn. 2019) (granting defendant’s First Amendment challenge to Minnesota’s stalking statute); Scott
v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (denying defendant’s First Amendment
challenge to Texas’s stalking statute).
17. A critic might reasonably question the wisdom of publishing a Comment that advocates for
restricting First Amendment rights given the danger to freedom of speech and the press that presently
appears to come from both sides of the ideological spectrum. See, e.g., Anthony L. Fisher, ‘Divided We
Fall’ Author David French on Why America Could Come Apart, the Loss of Free Speech Culture, and How
Trump Could Be the GOP’s New Reagan, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2020, 8:17
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/david-french-divided-we-fall-free-speech-culture-war-2020-9
[https://perma.cc/H82A-B9HC] (providing examples of free speech attacks by both liberals and
conservatives); A Letter on Justice and Open Debate, HARPER’S MAG. (July 7, 2020),
https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/ [https://perma.cc/Z4V2-Q6NC] (collecting
signatures from both left- and right-leaning individuals expressing concern at the attack on speech
coming from both ideological sides); Arthur Milikh, Freedom of Speech Under Dangerous
Attack from Left—We Must Preserve It, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/commentary/freedom-speech-under-dangerous-attack-leftwe-must-preserve-it [https://perma.cc/H3VS-GV6G] (critiquing liberal-leaning writers for advocating
to criminalize certain kinds of speech); The Trump Administration and the Media, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS (Apr. 16, 2020), https://cpj.org/reports/2020/04/trump-media-attacks-credibility-leaks/
[https://perma.cc/5CAV-WHDU] (“The Trump administration has stepped up prosecutions of news
sources, interfered in the business of media owners, harassed journalists crossing U.S. borders, and
empowered foreign leaders to restrict their own media.”). However, this Comment’s purpose is not to
advocate for blindly restricting a wide swath of free speech. Indeed, I applaud those individuals of all
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This Comment attempts to answer that question by offering a proposed
provision that prohibits stalking communications in a constitutionally
permissible way. While the U.S. Supreme Court has never specifically
addressed the constitutionality of stalking laws, 18 its precedent reveals general
principles that can guide legislatures on how to craft a provision that survives
constitutional challenges. Focusing on case law is especially important in a First
Amendment inquiry where the “law has developed into an elaborate mosaic of
specific judicial decisions, characteristic of the common law process of case-bycase adjudication.” 19 By evaluating and comparing these specific judicial
decisions with one another, concrete principals emerge that outline the contours
of an improved, constitutional stalking statute.
In the proposed provision, three key areas of less-protected speech
coalesce to form the boundaries of a constitutional stalking law: (1) unwanted
direct communications, (2) communications that violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and (3) communications that inflict substantial
emotional distress. While a law rooted in any one of these areas alone could not
survive a constitutional challenge, this Comment demonstrates how, when
combined, they create a narrowly defined content restriction able to overcome
the most rigorous of judicial tests.
To that end, this Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the
development of stalking laws in America and the First Amendment dilemma
they generate, as encapsulated in Mazur and Shackelford. Part II examines why
Shackelford, not Mazur, applied the correct analysis to North Carolina’s stalking
statute. Part III proposes a model provision that navigates the complexities
surrounding stalking communications by using established constitutional
principles. Finally, Part IV examines potential criticisms of the proposed
provision to ensure its survival under judicial scrutiny.

beliefs who, during these unprecedented times, have reiterated their commitment to free speech and
the marketplace of ideas. Instead, this Comment attempts to lay the foundation to narrow existing
stalking statutes (which currently impose overbroad restrictions on speech) in a way that protects the
First Amendment rights of defendants, while also ensuring that victims receive adequate protection
from harm. In doing so, it aims to strengthen the protections currently afforded to free speech by
ensuring that its limitation only occurs in the most extreme of circumstances.
18. Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1698
(2015) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet examined the constitutionality of any specialized
criminal harassment statute.”).
19. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300 (1993).
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I. THE PROBLEM: THE NEED FOR STALKING LAWS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT CONFLICT, AND THE DILEMMA OF MAZUR AND
SHACKELFORD
While the impetus behind the sudden rise of modern stalking legislation
has already been well documented, 20 a brief summary helps demonstrate the
importance of these statutes, the danger that victims faced prior to their
enactment, and the First Amendment challenges accompanying the statutes
since their inception.
A.

The History of Stalking Statutes

Stalking statutes arose in response to a significant, nationwide problem.
In the late 1980s, studies began to show that at least half of women who left an
abusive partner were followed and harassed or further attacked by the abuser. 21
In addition, nearly one-third of all women killed in the United States were
murdered by their husbands, with as many as ninety percent of those women
having experienced some sort of stalking behavior beforehand. 22
Even for those who escaped violence, the psychological toll of stalking was
significant. Almost one out of every four stalking victims considered suicide. 23
In addition, as many as seventy percent of victims suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder, characterized by depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping. 24
Other victims withdrew from social activities, struggled to maintain
relationships, or experienced difficulties when trying to complete daily tasks. 25
While national media attention at first gravitated to the sensational deaths of
celebrity victims, 26 further research quickly revealed that far more often the
victims were common citizens. 27 And the phenomenon was not rare: experts
20. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 9, at 793–94; Paul E. Mullen & Michele Pathé, Stalking, 29 CRIME
& JUST. 273, 273–75 (2002); Beagle, supra note 9, at 466–69; Guy, supra note 15, at 991–93 (1993);
Karbarz, supra note 9, at 333–37. For an in-depth look at the development of stalking laws throughout
history and a psychological analysis of stalking behavior, see generally Kathleen G. McAnaney, Laura
A. Curliss & C. Elizabeth Abeyta-Price, From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 819 (1993).
21. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1, 64 (1991).
22. Melinda Beck, Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 60.
23. Merschman, supra note 12, at 265.
24. Id.
25. Christine B. Gregson, Comment, California’s Antistalking Statute: The Pivotal Role of Intent, 28
GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 221, 228 (1998)
26. See, e.g., McAnaney et al., supra note 20, at 823–24 (explaining that actress Rebecca
Schaeffer’s death was the initial catalyst for stalking legislation); Beagle, supra note 9, at 467–68
(“California enacted [its stalking] statute largely in response to the 1989 death of a famous television
actress, Rebecca Schaeffer.”); Merschman, supra note 20, at 265–66.
27. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking but Some Experts Say Measures Are Vague,
USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A (stating that 17% of stalking victims are highly recognizable
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estimated that one out of every twenty women would endure stalking during
their lifetime. 28
Though recognition of stalking as a problem grew during the late 1980s,
stalking victims lacked adequate legal protection until the early 1990s. Prior to
the passage of stalking legislation, victims commonly used civil injunctions for
protection from stalkers. 29 Civil injunctions alone, however, were far from
effective. 30 Injunctions required victims to pay court fees, which could present
a serious obstacle to low-income stalking victims. 31 In addition, even when the
victim could afford court fees, most stalking occurred on the weekends or at
nighttime when courts were closed, meaning that often the only immediate
remedy available to victims was an unenforceable warning from a police officer
to the stalker. 32 Lastly, the injunctions themselves were not well enforced. 33 In
1992, only twenty states held injunction violators in criminal contempt, while
nine states did not impose any punishment whatsoever. 34 Even in those states
that allowed for damages, the punishment often failed to deter stalking behavior
when the defendant had little wealth or was insolvent. 35
Against that lax backdrop, criminal stalking statutes provided a welcome
relief to victims who lacked an otherwise adequate remedy. By making stalking
a criminal offense, victims no longer needed to worry about lacking adequate
funds for a civil injunction or waiting for a civil court to open. 36 The cost of
prosecution was borne by the state, 37 and police officers could arrest stalkers at
any hour of the day. 38 In addition, stalking statutes allowed prosecutors to
address a series of stalking incidents, rather than just an individual event, which

celebrities, 32% are lesser-known entertainment figures, 13% are former employers or other
professionals, and 38% are ordinary citizens).
28. Id. (discussing the work of Park Dietz, a clinical psychiatrist who conducted a major study of
stalking). Admittedly, men are also victims of stalking, but almost eighty percent of stalking victims
are women. Merschman, supra note 20, at 264.
29. Karbarz, supra note 9, at 335.
30. See Guy, supra note 15, at 997–98; Karbarz, supra note 9, at 335–36.
31. Bradburn, supra note 10, at 273.
32. Id. at 273–74.
33. Id. at 274.
34. Id.
35. Guy, supra note 15, at 997.
36. See, e.g., Gregson, supra note 25, at 233–38 (describing in detail the development of
California’s stalking statute which made stalking a crime, thus allowing the police to intervene on a
victim’s behalf).
37. See Victims of Crime: When Can a Lawsuit Be Filed?, SHOUSE CAL. L. GRP.,
https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/personal-injury/victim-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/7QGT-HZHA].
38. See Rex M. Scism, Human Fatigue in 24/7 Operations: Law Enforcement Considerations
and Strategies for Improved Performance, INT’L ASS’N CHIEFS POLICE, https://
www.policechiefmagazine.org/ [https://perma.cc/AGD4-BHYZ].
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frequently would not, on its own, rise to the level of a criminal offense. 39
Finally, stalking statutes provided serious criminal consequences, including jail
time, for stalking violations. 40
But while stalking statutes improved the recourse available to victims and
the number of stalking reports increased with their passage, 41 stalking remains
a major problem in the United States. A survey conducted by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention found that 4.2% of women and 2.1% of men
were stalked in 2011. 42 Among stalking victims, almost half experienced at least
one interaction with their stalker per week and 11% had been stalked for five
years or more. 43 Moreover, the rise in internet accessibility presents entirely
new challenges, with one in four victims reporting some form of cyberstalking
through email, instant messaging, or other means. 44 Nor have the effects of
stalking decreased with time. Victims still report feeling afraid and over 50%
report losing five days or more of work per year due to stalking. 45
Accordingly, creating stalking laws that survive constitutional scrutiny is
vitally important to ensure that victims have an effective remedy against a real
and dangerous threat. While stalking statutes should not enable the government
to trample on any citizen’s First Amendment rights, a carefully crafted law
should balance both goals without compromising either. But to find that
balance, one must understand why First Amendment challenges can prove fatal
to stalking legislation.

39. See Gregson, supra note 25, at 233; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277A(c) (LEXIS
through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (“A defendant is guilty of
stalking if the defendant willfully on more than one occasion harasses another person . . . .”).
40. Id. at 236.
41. NAT’L INST. FOR JUST. & CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, STALKING IN
AMERICA: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 9 (1998),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYS2-4BS3] (finding that stalking cases
“occurring before 1990 . . . were significantly less likely to be reported to the police than stalking cases
occurring after 1995, the year all 50 States and the District of Columbia had laws proscribing stalking”).
42. KATHLEEN C. BASILE, MATTHEW J. BREIDING, JIERU CHEN, MELISSA T. MERRICK,
SHARON G. SMITH & MIKEL L. WALTERS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
PREVALENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION — NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY, UNITED STATES, 2011, at 6–7 (2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
ss6308a1.htm [https://perma.cc/RQU5-W9YG].
43. Stalking,
BUREAU
JUST.
STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=973
[https://perma.cc/A7GL-S59U] [hereinafter Stalking].
44. KATRINA BAUM, SHANNAN CATALANO, MICHAEL RAND & KRISTINA ROSE,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. & NAT’L INST. OF JUST., STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-stalkingrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TGQ-UHHK].
45. Stalking, supra note 43.
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First Amendment Challenges to Stalking Statutes

Since their initial passage, stalking statutes have tangled with the First
Amendment. In Florida, the first known prosecution under its stalking statute
was against a man who followed an abortion clinic administrator, took pictures
of her, and attempted to obstruct her view while driving, all to show his
opposition to abortion. 46 Similarly, in 1993, soon after Texas enacted its new
stalking statute, a judge found eight individuals guilty for protesting outside of
abortion doctors’ residences. 47 In neither instance did the defendant raise a First
Amendment challenge to their convictions, but scholars were quick to note its
applicability in both cases. 48
Recent challenges have focused on the provisions of stalking statutes that
prohibit the stalker from communicating to or about the victim. Since stalkers
can inflict serious emotional distress by sending unwanted messages to
victims, 49 many statutes include provisions prohibiting harassing
communications. 50 However, once a statute restricts speech, it opens itself up
to potential First Amendment challenges.
For instance, in Scott v. State, 51 the defendant was convicted under Texas’s
stalking statute for making phone calls to “annoy,” “alarm,” and “embarrass” the
victim. 52 On the first appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the
statute’s language was unconstitutionally vague and therefore inhibited the
defendant’s exercise of his First Amendment freedoms. 53 But on a second
review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed its previous holding,
finding that the statute was drawn narrowly enough to avoid implicating any
First Amendment activity. 54
Other stalking statutes have not fared as well. In 2019, Minnesota’s
Supreme Court struck down the state’s stalking by mail statute, finding that it
prohibited expressive activities protected by the First Amendment, not merely
criminal conduct. 55 As these cases highlight, ultimately the constitutionality of
46. Karbarz, supra note 9, at 333.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Indicators of Stalking Behavior, LANGSTON UNIV., https://www.langston.edu/titleix/indicators-stalking-behavior [https://perma.cc/F7LF-X7GU] (listing examples of stalking behavior
such as “[p]ersistent phone calls” and “[s]ending the victim written messages, such as letters, email,
graffiti, text messages, IMs, etc.”).
50. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A(b)(2) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the
2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
51. 322 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), abrogated by Wilson v. State, 448 S.W.3d 418
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
52. Id. at 665.
53. Scott v. State, 298 S.W.3d 264, 272–73 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 322 S.W.3d 662 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010).
54. See Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 669–70.
55. In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 852–53 (Minn. 2019).
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a statute will depend on whether a court finds that it regulates speech or
criminal conduct.
1. The General Avenues for First Amendment Challenges
Generally, First Amendment challenges proceed along two different
routes: as applied or facial. If a party brings an as-applied challenge, they
“argue[] that a statute cannot be applied to [them] because its application would
violate [their] personal constitutional rights.” 56 In First Amendment litigation,
this requires the aggrieved party to prove that the statute prohibits them from
making a constitutionally protected communication. 57
For example, in Snyder v. Phelps, 58 the Westboro Baptist Church
challenged the application of Maryland’s tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”) to its protest of a soldier’s funeral. 59 The Supreme
Court ruled in the church’s favor because the topics addressed by the
protestors—“the political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals
involving the Catholic clergy”—were matters of public concern and thus
protected by the First Amendment. 60 As a result, even if the protest otherwise
met the requirements of IIED, the speech could not be punished because it was
constitutionally protected. 61 However, since the church brought an as-applied
challenge, the Court did not strike down Maryland’s entire IIED tort as
unconstitutional, just its specific application in the instant case. 62
In contrast, aggrieved parties can challenge an entire law for being overly
broad, even when the particular speech at issue is not constitutionally
protected. 63 When successful, this approach, known as an overbreadth or facial
challenge, will require a court to strike down the entire statute as
56. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1321, 1321 (2000).
57. See, e.g., Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (“An as-applied
challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant’s particular speech activity,
even though the law may be capable of valid application to others.”).
58. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
59. Id. at 448–50.
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id. at 456–58.
62. Id. at 460–61 (“Our holding today is narrow . . . ‘sweep[ing] no more broadly than the
appropriate context of the instant case.’” (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)));
see also Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Silencing State Courts, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3–4 (2018)
(noting that the Supreme Court’s opinion merely “set aside the jury verdict”; it did not declare the tort
itself unconstitutional in every application).
63. See Griffin v. Bryant, 30 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1160 (D.N.M. 2014) (“Even if the challenger
engaged in constitutionally unprotected, validly penalized speech, if he can establish that the statute
penalizes a substantial swath of protected speech, then he will prevail in getting the statute invalidated
not only as it relates to the constitutionally protected speech of others, but to his own unprotected
speech, as well.”).
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unconstitutional on its face. 64 Put simply, a court asks whether “a ‘substantial
number’ of its applications are unconstitutional, ‘judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” 65 The Supreme Court has allowed this
uniquely powerful remedy because overly broad speech statutes create “a
chilling effect whereby would-be speakers are intimidated from engaging in
constitutionally-protected speech, because—lacking a definitive front-end
ruling from the courts—they fear that their speech may be proscribed by the
speech restriction.” 66
For example, when Congress attempted to prohibit dog fighting and crush
videos 67 by punishing anyone who “create[d, sold], or possesse[d] a depiction of
animal cruelty” if done “for commercial gain,” 68 the Supreme Court in United
States v. Stevens 69 struck down the entire law as unconstitutional. 70 The Court
reasoned that due to its general language, the law was broad enough to enable
the prosecution of many forms of constitutionally protected speech, such as
hunting tutorials or clips of Spanish bullfighting. 71 Because the First
Amendment does not allow laws that criminalize a large swath of protected
speech, even when aimed at eliminating a widely decried social ill such as crush
videos, the Court struck down the entire statute. 72
Thus, stalking law defendants possess two options when trying to escape
conviction for communicative actions: as applied or facial challenges. While an
as-applied challenge may not appear as dangerous to stalking statutes as
overbreadth challenges, given that such challenges do not require a court to
strike down an entire act as facially unconstitutional, the more as-applied
challenges defendants win, the more a law will begin to look overly broad. In
turn, the more overly broad a statute starts to look, the more susceptible it
becomes to facial challenges, risking the entire statute’s invalidation. 73
Therefore, drafting a statute that can survive a substantial number of as-applied
challenges increases the likelihood that the statute will also survive a facial

64. Id. at 1156; Fallon, supra note 56.
65. Wash. St. Grange v. Wash. St. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (quoting New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 748, 769–71 (1982)).
66. Griffin, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 1150.
67. Crush videos “typically depict women in stilettos or bare feet literally crushing, stomping on,
or impaling, small, helpless animals to satisfy . . . sexual fetishes of . . . viewers." Crush Videos, ANIMAL
WELFARE INST., https://awionline.org/content/crush-videos [https://perma.cc/KX3G-KTVT].
68. 18 U.S.C. § 48.
69. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
70. Id. at 482.
71. Id. at 478–79.
72. Id. at 481–82.
73. See id. at 472–73 (describing the effect of a facial challenge); Fallon, supra note 56, at 1321
(explaining that a facial challenge involves arguing that a statute is generally invalid on its face).
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challenge. 74 Moreover, when facing an as-applied challenge, the state has
numerous ways to argue that its applications comport with established First
Amendment jurisprudence.
a.

Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct

When facing an as-applied challenge, the state has numerous ways to argue
that an application comports with established First Amendment jurisprudence.
One common argument utilized by prosecutors is that the provisions at issue
prohibit only speech integral to criminal conduct. 75 First recognized in Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 76 the “speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct” doctrine
(“the criminal conduct exception”) removes otherwise protected speech from
the First Amendment’s reach if a court finds that the speech was “used as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute.” 77 The criminal
conduct exception is used to justify speech restrictions in typical common law
crimes such as conspiracy, solicitation, or aiding and abetting. 78 While such
crimes require speech as part of their commission, since such speech is integral
to the criminal conduct, it falls outside the protection of the First
Amendment. 79 As a result, legislatures can restrict speech integral to criminal
conduct without violating the Constitution. 80 Therefore, convincing a court
that a stalking statute prohibits only speech within the criminal conduct
exception can provide a huge win to prosecutors, and entirely thwart
defendants’ attempts to challenge their convictions. 81
Related to the criminal conduct exception, the Supreme Court has also
recognized specific categories of speech that fail to receive any First
Amendment protection, including “obscenity, defamation, fraud, [and]
incitement.” 82 Like speech integral to criminal conduct, a legislature can restrict
74. In theory, a statute might exist that has both a substantial number of legitimate and
illegitimate applications and thus would fail a facial challenge under the Supreme Court’s overbreadth
jurisprudence. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988). This
Comment simply argues that the less illegitimate, and therefore less unconstitutional, applications a
statute has, the less likely it is to fail a facial challenge. See id.
75. See United States v. Ackell, 907 F.3d 67, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Gonzalez,
905 F.3d 165, 192 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012); State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 554,
825 S.E.2d 689, 697 (2019) (“Specifically, the State contends that Defendant’s posts constitute ‘speech
that is integral to criminal conduct’—a category of speech that falls outside of the protection provided
by the First Amendment.”).
76. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
77. Id. at 498; Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 18, at 1708–09.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. State v. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. 538, 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *7 (2018)
(unpublished table decision).
82. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010).
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any speech that falls within one of these categories without infringing upon the
First Amendment. 83 However, the Court has not recognized stalking
communications as comprising one of these distinct categories of unprotected
speech, nor does it appear ready to expand the current list beyond its historical
collection. 84 Accordingly, if a prosecutor cannot justify a stalking prohibition
using the criminal conduct exception, they will need to employ a different
argument to survive a First Amendment challenge.
b.

Content-Neutral Restriction

Another argument open to prosecutors is that the restriction comprises a
constitutional, content-neutral restriction. Supreme Court precedent is “clear”
that “the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” 85 Because these restrictions
do not depend on the content of the message, they are known as content-neutral
restrictions and must only survive intermediate scrutiny. 86 Intermediate
scrutiny requires that restrictions be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.’” 87 In general, the Supreme Court has used
this test to uphold statutes it deemed content neutral. 88 However, if a court
determines that the statute makes a content-based restriction, it will need to
survive the most rigorous of judicial tests: strict scrutiny. 89
To determine whether a statute makes a content-based distinction, a court
examines whether the law can be “justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech.” 90 This is quite different than content-neutral restrictions,
such as how loud music can be played in a public park, 91 which apply the same
83. See Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
981, 999 (2016) [hereinafter Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct].
84. Id. at 1015 (“Since United States v. Stevens, the Court has taken the view—whether rightly or
wrongly—that the list of First Amendment exceptions is essentially limited to historically recognized
exceptions, such as the ones for obscenity, libel, and the like.”).
85. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
86. Id. at 798; see, e.g., First Amendment — Freedom of Speech — Content Neutrality — McCullen v.
Coakley, 128 HARV. L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2014) [hereinafter First Amendment — Freedom of Speech]
(using the terms “content-neutral” and “intermediate scrutiny” to describe the Supreme Court’s recent
application of the standard announced in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
87. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
88. See First Amendment — Freedom of Speech, supra note 86, at 221.
89. State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 874, 787 S.E.2d 814, 818; see also Reed v. Gilbert, 576 U.S.
155, 163 (2015). Strict scrutiny holds laws “presumptively unconstitutional and . . . justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Id. at 163.
90. Reed, 576 U.S. at 164.
91. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 803.
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to all speech, regardless of its message. For instance, the Supreme Court found
that a statute prohibiting U.S. citizens from providing material support to
terrorists created a content-based restriction because the only way to determine
whether the speech at issue provided material support was to examine what
message the speaker communicated. 92 Or, in the words of the Court, if
“[p]laintiffs want to speak to [terrorist groups], and whether they may do so
under [the relevant statute] depends on what they say,” then the statute is a
content-based restriction. 93 Once a court determines that a statute is contentbased, a prosecutor will have only one argument remaining.
c.

Strict Scrutiny

If a court finds that the statute at issue not only regulates speech outside
of the criminal conduct exception but also that it creates a content-based
restriction, the statute’s last hope is to survive strict scrutiny—the highest
standard of review in constitutional jurisprudence. 94 A prudent prosecutor will
avoid having a statute’s application examined under strict scrutiny since it
famously proves “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” 95 Strict scrutiny “requires
the [g]overnment to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” 96 If the state can pass this
test, then it can regulate any speech, regardless of whether it turns on the
content of a speaker’s message. 97
Thus, prosecutors can raise an array of justifications when defendants
challenge a stalking statute on First Amendment grounds. The North Carolina
cases of Mazur and Shackelford demonstrate the strengths and limitations of
these arguments.
2. North Carolina’s First Amendment Challenges to Stalking Statutes
North Carolina courts have recently begun wrestling with the conflict
between stalking laws and the First Amendment in the cases of Mazur 98 and

92. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 22 (2010).
93. Id.
94. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163–64; Bishop, 368 N.C. at 874–75, 787 S.E.2d at 818; Strict Scrutiny,
CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny#:~:text
=Strict%20scrutiny%20is%20the%20highest,scrutiny%20and%20rational%20basis%20review
[https://perma.cc/CF3F-XEWN].
95. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); see also Peter J.
Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and
Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000).
96. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011) (quoting
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)).
97. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 171.
98. 261 N.C. App. 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 2018 WL 4440576 (2018) (unpublished table decision).
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Shackelford. 99 However, unlike the Texas or Minnesota cases which dealt with
overbreadth, 100 the North Carolinian defendants succeeded, or almost
succeeded, by using as-applied challenges. 101
a.

Mazur: North Carolina’s Stalking Law Prohibits Criminal Conduct

In Mazur, the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Mazur were convicted of stalking
their neighbors Mr. and Mrs. O’Neal. 102 The saga began when Mrs. Mazur
went over to the O’Neals’ house and asked Mr. O’Neal to turn down his
music. 103 After Mr. O’Neal refused to comply, Mrs. Mazur called the police and
reported a noise violation. 104 When the police arrived, they found Mr. O’Neal
playing music and issued him a citation. 105 Following that incident, the Mazurs
commenced a campaign of harassment against the O’Neals, filing numerous
baseless complaints with the local police department. 106 In addition, the Mazurs
began calling the O’Neals racial slurs and employing playground insults,
describing Mr. O’Neal as “frog-eyed” or “froggy” and calling Mrs. O’Neal a
“pig.” 107 Once insults were no longer enough, the Mazurs placed a statue of a
frog in their yard and a statue of a pig with its butt in the air toward the O’Neals’
home. 108 The Mazurs even made “googley-eye” glasses which they wore in their
yard to mock Mr. O’Neal’s appearance. 109 Finally, the Mazurs began recording
the O’Neals with a handheld video camera. 110
Eventually, Mr. O’Neal filed a complaint that resulted in the county
charging the Mazurs with misdemeanor stalking and issuing a no-contact order
between the two parties. 111 Once out on bond, the Mazurs installed three highpowered surveillance cameras with night vision capabilities in their yard, facing
the O’Neals’ house. 112 With the help of these videos, the Mazurs began taking
copious notes on the O’Neals’ departures and returns. 113 In addition, the Mazurs

99. 264 N.C. App. 542, 825 S.E.2d 689 (2019).
100. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
101. See Mazur, 261 N.C. App. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *9; Shackelford, 264
N.C. App at 551, 825 S.E.2d at 695. An as-applied challenge involves “a party argu[ing] that a statute
cannot be applied to her because its application would violate her personal constitutional rights.”
Fallon, supra note 56, at 1321.
102. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *5.
107. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *2.
108. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *1.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *2.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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occasionally drove behind Mr. O’Neal and his son as they walked about the
neighborhood. 114
While those activities may have been enough for the State to proceed with
a successful felony stalking case, what the Mazurs did next—and what the jury
in-part relied upon to convict them—created a complex and unique First
Amendment dilemma. During the ensuing October, the Mazurs erected alleged
Halloween decorations in their yard, primarily consisting of Tupperware bowls
with lightbulbs and red lines inside to look like an eyeball with veins. 115 In
addition, the Mazurs hung large decorative eyeglasses with googly eyes painted
on them on their mailbox and in trees facing the O’Neals. 116 When a trick-ortreating neighbor asked Mrs. Mazur what the decorations meant, she replied
that “their intent was to convey the message that they—Defendants—‘had their
eyes on Mr. O’Neal.’” 117
Eventually, the Mazurs went to trial where a jury found the couple guilty
of felony stalking. 118 Because the court admitted the evidence of the frog and
pig statues, as well as the Halloween decorations, the Mazurs immediately
appealed their conviction, arguing that these items constituted First
Amendment protected expressive conduct. 119 In response, the State argued that
the decorations were actually prohibited contact by the Mazurs with the
O’Neals, and thus North Carolina could prohibit it like any other contact,
regardless of its expressive merit. 120
After reviewing the case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted
the State’s argument. First, it acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in Giboney 121 that speech integral to criminal conduct is unprotected—the
criminal conduct exception. 122 Next, it found that the felony stalking statute,
which prohibited “harassing conduct,” was not a content-based restriction on
speech because “prohibiting certain conduct, while involving ‘speech,’ does not
necessarily violate the First Amendment when the statute’s focus is on the
conduct.” 123 Finally, because it found that the “[d]efendants point[ed] to no
evidence presented at trial that they were seeking to express a message
unreleated [sic] to Mr. O’Neal and [were] only incidentally harassing him,” the

114. Id.
115. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *6.
120. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *5.
121. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *6 (discussing Giboney).
122. Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)); see supra
Section I.B.1.a.
123. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *6.
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court concluded that the decorations were not speech and no First Amendment
violation occurred. 124
In doing so, the Mazur court never stopped to examine whether the yard
decorations constituted speech on their own. Rather, the Mazur court held that,
because any message communicated by the yard signs was harassing, it was
automatically criminal conduct. This reasoning was conclusory, and as
explained in Section II.A, incorrect. But because the Mazur court viewed any
prohibitions on speech in North Carolina’s felony stalking statute as incidental,
it concluded the statute restricted exclusively criminal conduct. Only months
later, a different panel would examine that same statute and reach a different
conclusion.
b.

Shackelford: North Carolina’s Stalking Statute Restricts Protected Speech

Though Shackelford’s facts were quite different from Mazur’s, the true
contrast between the cases lies in how Shackelford applied the criminal conduct
exception. In Shackelford, the defendant attended a Good Friday service at a
Charlotte-based church where he met a church member, to whom the court gave
the pseudonym “Mary.” 125 After a brief conversation in a group setting, the two
parted ways, and Mary gave no further thought to the exchange. 126 Several
weeks later, Mary received an email from the defendant to her work account,
asking if she would agree to meet with him to discuss a communications plan
for his company. 127 Initially interested, Mary agreed to meet with the defendant
to discuss the business but later retracted her offer after receiving a subsequent
email from the defendant where he offered to pay Mary “100K . . . AND take
[her] out to dinner at any restaurant in Charlotte.” 128
Despite Mary’s refusal, the defendant continued trying to contact her.
Two weeks after his last email, the defendant sent Mary a handwritten letter to
her work address stating that when he saw her at the service he “thought he had
found his soul mate” and that he wanted to take her on a date. 129
Understandably disturbed, Mary resolved to have no further contact with the
defendant, and asked her supervisors to intervene. 130 One of the ministers at
Mary’s church had a phone call with the defendant and asked him to cease
contacting Mary. 131 After the phone call, the defendant did not send another
letter or email. 132
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *7.
State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 543, 825 S.E.2d 689, 691 (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 543–44, 825 S.E.2d at 691.
Id. at 544, 825 S.E.2d at 691–92.
Id. at 545, 825 S.E.2d at 692.
Id.
Id.
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Instead, the defendant took to social media, specifically Google Plus, to
publicly announce his affection for Mary. 133 The same month that her minister
talked with the defendant, Mary logged on to her Google Plus account to
discover that the defendant had followed her account and had referenced her in
four separate posts. 134 Though the defendant stopped using Mary’s name
following his conversation with the minister, a subsequent post included a
shortened version of her name and another post included her initials. 135 But
even when defendant’s posts did not specifically name Mary, the subject of
them remained clear, referring to her as “a woman at my church.” 136
Though disturbed by the defendant’s posts, Mary refrained from legal
action until she received a box of cupcakes at her work, accompanied by an
unsigned note which read “[Mary], I never properly thanked you for the help
you gave me regarding my company’s communication plan, so, with these
cupcakes, please accept my thanks.” 137 Following the delivery, Mary filed a
report with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department that resulted in the
defendant’s arrest on charges of misdemeanor stalking. 138 When Mary filed a
petition for a no-contact order, the district court granted it and forbade the
defendant from contacting Mary or “posting any information about [her] on
social media.” 139
After receiving the order, the defendant refused to comply. Subsequent
social media activity included: a post naming his favorite Carolina Panther’s
cheerleader, accompanied by a statement claiming it would make Mary jealous;
a post praying his “future wife’s family” was okay, following a significant
rainstorm in South Carolina where Mary’s family lived; and a post indicating
that he had looked through Mary’s Pinterest boards to determine which of the
Myers-Briggs personality types she possessed. 140 In addition, the defendant
sent two emails to a close friend of Mary, one of which requested that the friend
ask Mary to tell the truth in court and another which detailed an elaborate
scheme to allow Mary to “save face” by having the defendant take a televised

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546, 825 S.E.2d at 692. Examples include this post from June 28, 2015:

I’m feeling depressed. There’s a woman at my church that I want really, really bad, but she
doesn’t want me. I’ve prayed to God asking him to relieve this pain in my heart by allowing
me to view just a small glimpse of her angelic face while in church, but God won’t even give
me that. :(
Id.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 546, 825 S.E.2d at 693.
Id.
Id. at 547, 825 S.E.2d at 693.
Id. at 548, 825 S.E.2d at 693–94.

99 N.C. L REV. 479 (2021)

498

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

polygraph test live on CNN to prove that he had talked to God at least twenty
times and seen God’s face five times. 141
While the State originally planned to prosecute the defendant for violating
the no-contact order, the trial court ultimately dismissed those charges out of a
concern that the language in the no-contact order was unconstitutional and
instead relied on the stalking charges. 142 Following his conviction of four counts
of stalking, the defendant immediately appealed, arguing that his social media
activity was protected by the First Amendment. 143
Unlike in Mazur, the reviewing court in Shackelford found that North
Carolina’s felony stalking law did not exclusively cover speech integral to
criminal conduct. Per the statute, a defendant is guilty of stalking if he engages
in a “course of conduct” that causes the victim to “[s]uffer substantial emotional
distress by placing [them] in fear of . . . continued harassment.” 144 But unlike
Mazur, which focused simply on this prohibition of harassing conduct, 145
Shackelford dug deeper into the statute’s language. 146 A “course of conduct” is
defined by the statute as “[t]wo or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts
in which the stalker directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action,
method, device, or means . . . communicates to or about a person.” 147 To analyze
whether this provision was constitutional, the Shackelford court began by noting
that social media posts constitute a protected form of expression under the First
Amendment. 148 Next, the Shackelford court acknowledged the existence of the
criminal conduct exception, 149 but found that, to fall within that exception, the
speech at issue must possess some relationship to a criminal act outside of the
speech itself. 150 Since a stalking conviction could rest exclusively on two
communicative acts, such as any two of the defendant’s Google Plus posts about
Mary, the Shackelford court held that the North Carolina statute did not qualify
for the criminal conduct exception. 151 Finding that the North Carolina statute

141. Id. at 548–49, 825 S.E.2d at 694.
142. Id. at 549, 825 S.E.2d at 694–95.
143. Id. at 550, 825 S.E.2d at 695.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A(c) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.
of the Gen. Assemb.).
145. State v. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *6 (2018)
(unpublished table decision).
146. See Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. at 551, 825 S.E.2d at 695–96.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A(b)(1).
148. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. at 552, 825 S.E.2d at 696 (discussing State v. Bishop, 368 N.C.
869, 873, 787 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2016), where a statute was found to regulate protected speech because
it “outlawed posting particular subject matter on the internet”).
149. See id. at 555, 825 S.E.2d at 697.
150. Id. at 554–56, 825 S.E.2d at 697–98 (relying in part on People v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341,
352 (Ill. 2017), an Illinois Supreme Court case that addressed a law very similar to North Carolina’s
felony stalking statute).
151. Id. at 556, 825 S.E.2d at 698.
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made “the speech itself . . . the criminal violation,” 152 and not merely a vehicle
by which criminal activity occurs, 153 the Shackelford court concluded that the
criminal conduct exception was not applicable. 154
After finding that the statute regulated speech, not criminal conduct, the
Shackelford court proceeded to the next step in a First Amendment analysis—
does the statute create a content-based or content-neutral restriction? According
to Reed v. Gilbert, 155 a content-based restriction exists when a law “cannot be
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” 156 Only a
year before Shackelford, the Supreme Court of North Carolina embraced this
standard, holding that a content-based restriction exists when a court cannot
“determine whether the accused has committed a crime without examining the
content of his communication.” 157 To determine this principle’s application, the
Shackelford court looked to People v. Relerford, 158 where the Illinois Supreme
Court examined a stalking law that criminalized “distressing” speech. 159 Because
the law required a defendant’s speech be examined to determine whether it was
“distressing," the Illinois Supreme Court found that the law created a contentbased restriction. 160 Applying that same reasoning, the Shackelford court
concluded that since the only way to determine whether a communication
violated North Carolina’s felony stalking law was to examine whether it “would
cause a reasonable person to . . . [s]uffer substantial emotional distress,” the
statute created a content-based restriction. 161
Once the Shackelford court determined that the law created a content-based
distinction, the final step was to apply strict scrutiny—which all content-based
restrictions must meet. 162 Assuming arguendo that North Carolina’s stated
purpose of preventing stalking from escalating into more dangerous behavior
constituted a compelling state interest, the Shackelford court found that the
stalking statute was not the least restrictive means to achieve that stated

152. Id. at 556–57, 825 S.E.2d at 698–99 (quoting United Food & Com. Workers Loc. 99 v.
Bennett, 934 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1208 (D. Ariz. 2013)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 556, 825 S.E.2d at 689–99.
155. 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
156. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. at 557, 825 S.E.2d at 699 (alteration in original) (quoting Reed,
576 U.S. at 164).
157. Id. at 558, 825 S.E.2d at 699 (quoting State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 876, 787 S.E.2d 814,
819 (2016)).
158. 104 N.E.3d 341 (Ill. 2017).
159. Id. at 350.
160. Id.
161. Shackelford, 464 N.C. App. at 558, 825 S.E.2d at 699 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14277.3A(c)(2) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)).
162. Id. at 558, 825 S.E.2d at 700; see also Reed v. Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (stating that
strict scrutiny holds laws “presumptively unconstitutional and . . . justified only if the government
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests”).
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purpose. 163 As an example of a less restrictive means, the Shackelford court noted
that the law could have simply required a no-contact order prohibiting the
defendant from approaching or contacting Mary. 164 But by also prohibiting the
defendant from posting his feelings about Mary on social media, the felony
stalking statute included an additional, unnecessary restriction on protected
speech. 165 Accordingly, the statute’s application to the defendant was not as least
restrictive as possible, failing strict scrutiny. 166
Together, Mazur and Shackelford represent the two main approaches to
First Amendment challenges brought against stalking statutes. On one side,
Mazur illustrates how easily courts can uphold a statute if they determine that
any implicated speech is simply “criminal conduct” that falls outside of First
Amendment protection. Conversely, the Shackelford approach demonstrates
that when the statute is treated as a content-based restriction, it must survive a
far more rigorous examination. As states seek to pass legislation that will
effectively protect victims from stalkers, they must determine which approach
correctly applies to proposed statutes.
II. ANALYZING THE DECISIONS: WHETHER THE REASONING IN MAZUR
OR SHACKELFORD COMPORTS WITH FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Mazur and Shackelford examine two different forms of stalking
communications—yard decorations and social media posts—and reach two
different outcomes. To determine whether either outcome is correct, this
Comment uses existing jurisprudence to ask two fundamental questions of each
case: (1) Is the conduct at issue speech, and (b) can the government restrict that
speech without violating the First Amendment? When analyzed using these
questions, the Shackelford court appears to reach the correct result, while the
Mazur court appears to err in its analysis.
A.

Is the Conduct at Issue Speech?

Every First Amendment inquiry begins by determining whether the
conduct at issue is speech or at least expressive conduct. After all, if the
defendants’ actions do not amount to speech, or even expressive conduct, then
they will not fall under the protections of the First Amendment. 167 For instance,
in Willis v. Marshall, 168 the plaintiff sued the town, arguing that it violated her
163. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. at 559, 825 S.E.2d at 700.
164. Id. at 560, 825 S.E.2d at 700.
165. Id. at 562, 825 S.E.2d at 702.
166. Id. at 560, 825 S.E.2d at 700.
167. Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (“To resolve this issue we must first decide
whether solicitation in the context of the CFC is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it
is not, we need go no further.”).
168. 426 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2005).
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First Amendment rights when it refused to allow her to dance at a community
depot. 169 However, the Fourth Circuit found that recreational dancing was
neither speech nor expressive conduct, and thus the plaintiff could not bring a
First Amendment claim. 170 In sum, the First Amendment only applies where
some recognized form of communication occurs.
In Shackelford, the defendant’s social media posts expressing his feelings
and frustrations toward Mary 171 constitute speech and deserve First
Amendment protection. Though a relatively new technology, the internet
receives as much First Amendment protection as any other form of
communication. 172 As noted by the Supreme Court, the internet provides
today’s pamphleteer “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication
of all kinds.” 173 In particular, the Court has specifically recognized social media
as the modern world’s primary form of communication and particularly worthy
of First Amendment protection. 174 Therefore, the Shackelford court correctly
held that the defendant’s Google Plus posts fell within the scope of the First
Amendment.
Mazur, in contrast, does not present quite as clear of a situation. While
Shackelford involved social media posts with words, the expressive properties of
frog eye and pig butt statues are not as readily apparent. However, the Supreme
Court has never held that the First Amendment protects only those
communications involving words. 175 Instead, symbols and other nonverbal
conduct can receive constitutional protection when sufficiently expressive. 176
To determine if First Amendment protections apply, the Court looks to
whether an action or symbol conveys a “particularized message,” and whether
there is a great likelihood that the message would be understood. 177
In Mazur, while the defendant’s nonexpressive physical conduct (such as
following the victims in their car) did not fall under the expressive conduct
cover of the First Amendment, the statues and yard decorations likely did fall
within its protection. Admittedly, uncertainty exists as to what types of yard

169. Id. at 255.
170. Id. at 257–59.
171. See supra notes 133–41 and accompanying text.
172. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
173. Id.
174. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“[T]o foreclose access to
social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First
Amendment rights.”).
175. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“The First Amendment literally forbids the
abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken
or written word.”).
176. See id. at 406.
177. See Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404).
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decorations receive First Amendment protections due to their artistic merit. 178
But the Mazur defendants possessed a strong argument that the statues and
googly eye decorations met the requirements of symbolic speech. In Spence v.
Washington, 179 the Supreme Court found that a college student engaged in
symbolic speech when, on private property, he hung an upside-down American
flag with a peace sign taped onto it outside of his window in order to protest
the Cambodian invasion and Kent State shooting. 180 In making its decision, the
Court looked to the intent of the speaker, the audience’s understanding of the
display, and the context surrounding it. 181
Applying that same test to the facts in Mazur leads to the same conclusion
reached in Spence. First, the defendants freely disclosed the intent behind the
decorations: to communicate that they “had their eyes on Mr. O’Neal.” 182
Second, as for the audience’s understanding of the displays and the context of
the situation, the two-year, vitriolic dispute between the neighbors provided the
O’Neals more than ample understanding of the decoration’s antagonizing
message. Similarly, the message conveyed by the frog and pig statues—erected
to reference the defendants’ favorite insults 183—would be easily understood by
the O’Neals who were the intended recipients of these insults. Moreover, any
argument by the State that these decorations were not speech is fatally
undermined by the State’s choice to include the decorations as evidence in its
case against the defendants—evidence that was only relevant because of the
message communicated by the decorations. If the decorations were not speech,
they would have no bearing on the case.
Therefore, because the defendants in both Shackelford and Mazur were
convicted in part for engaging in speech, the State needed a way to punish that
speech without violating the First Amendment. Admittedly, the defendants had
both committed other nonspeech acts which might have substantiated a stalking
conviction alone, such as sending cupcakes in Shackelford or following the
O’Neals in Mazur. But precedent requires appellate courts to reverse any
conviction that may have rested upon unconstitutional grounds. 184 Because
178. See Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 324, 326–29 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that
a decorated junk car kept in front yard to communicate “make love not war” was not expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment); David Leichtman & Avani Bhatt, Federal Courts and the
Communicative Value of Visual Art: Is an Intended Message Required for Strong Protection of Rights Under the
First Amendment?, FED. LAW., Sept. 2011, at 25; see also Brian Soucek, The Constitutional Irrelevance of
Art, 99 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2021) (exploring First Amendment protections of “art” and
recognizing that such protections may be more difficult to achieve for nontraditional art forms).
179. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
180. Id. at 406.
181. Id. at 413–15.
182. State v. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 2018 WL 44440576, at *4 (2018)
(unpublished table decision).
183. Id. at 538, 817 S.E.2d at 919, 2018 WL 444057 at *2.
184. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931).
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neither case specified whether the jury used the protected speech as evidence to
convict the defendants, reversal was warranted in both instances. 185 As a result,
the State’s only hope for winning on appeal was to find an argument that the
defendant’s speech in each case was not protected.
B.

Can the Government Restrict Either Defendants’ Speech Without Violating the
First Amendment?

To escape the First Amendment’s reach, the State argued in both cases
that the speech was integral to criminal conduct. 186 As previously illustrated, 187
the criminal conduct exception removes otherwise protected speech from the
First Amendment’s reach if a court finds that the speech was “used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute.” 188 With the steady increase
of this exception’s popularity, 189 several circuits have come to rely on it to
uphold convictions under the federal interstate stalking statute. 190 For example,
in United States v. Osinger, 191 the defendant was convicted of interstate stalking
for posting naked pictures of his ex-girlfriend on the internet without her
consent. 192 When the defendant brought a First Amendment challenge, the
Eighth Circuit found that any expressive activity prohibited by the law was
necessarily “tethered to the underlying criminal conduct and not to speech.” 193
Having reached that conclusion, the Osinger court had no difficulty upholding
the statute. 194
However, the circuits’ use of the criminal conduct exception does not
appear to comply with the current standard articulated by the Supreme Court.
As noted by Professor Eugene Volokh, the Supreme Court only uses the
criminal conduct exception when the crime at issue includes some additional act
other than the speech itself. 195 Simply labelling speech “criminal” is not
sufficient to place that speech within the criminal conduct exception. 196 Thus,
185. Indeed, because North Carolina’s felony stalking statute requires two separate actions to
constitute a conviction, and only one nonspeech action occurred in Shackelford, the State would have
been unable to satisfy the elements of the crime as a matter of law. State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App.
542, 560–61, 825 S.E.2d 689, 701 (2019).
186. Id. at 554, 825 S.E.2d at 697.
187. See supra Section I.B.1.a.
188. Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 18, at 1708–09.
189. Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct, supra note 83, at 983–84.
190. See id. at 1040; see also United States v. Ackell, 907 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 2012 (2019); United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 192 (3d Cir. 2018) cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
2727 (2019); United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Osinger,
753 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2014).
191. 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014).
192. Id. at 942.
193. Id. at 944.
194. Id. at 948.
195. Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct, supra note 83, at 1011.
196. Id.
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when the Supreme Court used the criminal conduct exception to uphold the
ban on advertising child pornography in New York v. Ferber, 197 it focused on the
link between the expressive action of advertising the materials and the separate
criminal conduct of producing it. 198 But when no separate criminal act exists
other than the speech itself, the criminal conduct exception becomes
inapplicable. 199 Otherwise, a court could take speech that it does not like, relabel
it as conduct, and place it outside the First Amendment’s protections. 200 Such a
conclusory analysis would thwart “the whole point of modern First Amendment
doctrine” which is “to protect speech against many laws that make such speech
illegal.” 201 As noted in New York Times v. Sullivan, 202 states cannot avoid First
Amendment scrutiny by placing “mere labels” on controversial forms of
speech. 203
Based off these principles, the Ninth Circuit appears to have applied an
incorrect version of the criminal conduct exception in Osinger. 204 While a state
likely can prohibit the conduct at issue in Osinger—posting a nude photo of an
ex-lover without consent 205—the Ninth Circuit’s path to reach this result was
not a constitutionally acceptable route. Rather than dig into the complexities
surrounding the issue of revenge porn, the Ninth Circuit simply noted that
“[a]ny expressive aspects of Osinger’s speech” were part of “harassing
conduct”—conduct that the United States prohibits. 206 But, as noted by
Professor Volokh, the Ninth Circuit reached this result by essentially just

197. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
198. Id. at 761–62 (1982).
199. Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct, supra note 83, at 1011.
200. Id. at 1036–39.
201. Id. at 987.
202. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
203. Id. at 269. Recent Supreme Court precedent has not provided further clarification on this
topic. For instance, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), the Supreme Court had
a chance to revisit when speech can be relabeled as conduct. Id. at 27 n.5. But the Court refused to
explore the issue, noting simply that “the Government [did] not develop it.” Id.
204. Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct, supra note 83, at 1040–41.
205. See, e.g., State v. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95, ¶ 69, 214 A.3d 791, 814 (2019) (upholding Vermont’s
revenge porn statute as a narrowly tailored, content-based restriction on protected speech); Danielle
Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 375–
76 (2014) (arguing that an analysis similar to the one used in decisions upholding the private right of
action in the Federal Wiretap Act and the tort for public disclosure of private fact permit a finding
that revenge porn statutes do not violate the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, Florida “Revenge Porn”
Bill, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 10, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/10/floridarevenge-porn-bill/ [https://perma.cc/8A8W-LZZE] (arguing that revenge porn can be prohibited as a
form of obscenity). But see Ex parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (Tex. App.
May 16, 2018), disc. rev. granted (July 25, 2018) (holding that Texas’s prohibition on revenge porn was
facially overbroad).
206. United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2014).

99 N.C. L REV. 479 (2021)

2021]

FROG EYES AND PIG BUTTS

505

“relabeling the speech as ‘conduct.’” 207 Nowhere in its opinion did the Ninth
Circuit point to any separate criminal act outside of the speech itself.
Returning to North Carolina, Shackelford appears to correctly reject the
State’s argument that the defendant’s otherwise protected Google Plus posts
were transformed into criminal conduct. Conversely, Mazur’s finding that the
speech at issue was criminal conduct appears to contradict established
precedent. Unlike the speech advertising child pornography in Ferber, the
speech at issue in both Mazur and Shackelford was not integral to a separate
criminal action different than the speech itself. The yard decorations in Mazur
and the social media posts in Shackelford were integral to harassing conduct only
as far as the decorations and posts themselves harassed the victims. Without a
separate criminal action occurring, the posts and decorations could not fall
within the criminal conduct exception as it is understood today. Accepting the
State’s argument that the stalking law prohibited “harassing conduct,” and thus
any speech covered by the statute fell outside the First Amendment, would
empower the government to criminalize any speech it found distasteful. But
protected speech does not lose its protection simply because a statute happens
to define that speech as conduct. 208 Accordingly, if a state wishes to protect
victims from stalking actions taken through a communicative medium, it needs
a different vehicle than the criminal conduct exception.
III. CORRECTING SHACKELFORD AND MAZUR: HOW TO LIMIT A STALKING
STATUTE’S REACH TO COVER ONLY THE SPEECH THAT A STATE CAN
CONSTITUTIONALLY RESTRICT
How can courts uphold stalking convictions predicated upon the
communicative actions of a defendant? Without the criminal conduct exception,
North Carolina’s felony stalking law becomes a content-based restriction,
subject to strict scrutiny. 209 While the General Assembly could simply eliminate
the part of the statute that prohibits expressive actions, such a solution would
not adequately address the problem of stalking. Unwanted communications
from a defendant to a victim are a classic part of stalking behavior. 210 In order
to effectively protect victims from such actions, North Carolina needs a law that
will prohibit these communications without violating the First Amendment. To
that end, this Comment suggests the following “proposed provision”:

207. Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct, supra note 83, at 1042.
208. See id. at 1036–39.
209. See State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 874, 787 S.E.2d 814, 818 (2016) (“Content based speech
regulations must satisfy strict scrutiny.”).
210. Robert T. Muller, In the Mind of a Stalker, PSYCH. TODAY (June 22, 2013),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talking-about-trauma/201306/in-the-mind-stalker
[https://perma.cc/68RA-2ZBR].
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Two or more communications that the defendant intentionally directs to
an individual when:
(1) the defendant knows or has reason to know that the individual does
not consent to receiving the communications;
(2) the defendant directs the communications to reach the individual at
a location where the individual possesses a reasonable expectation of
privacy from such communications; and
(3) the defendant knows or should know that the receipt of these
communications would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress. 211
As discussed below, the proposed provision walks the tightrope between
free speech and citizen safety, and possesses several unique features derived
from Supreme Court precedent that should enable the provision to pass even
the strictest of judicial examinations.
Admittedly, critics might question this Comment’s embrace of strict
scrutiny as the best way to uphold a stalking statute. After all, the Supreme
Court itself has noted that “it is [a] rare case in which we have held that a law
survives strict scrutiny” 212 and precautioned against the test becoming “strict in
theory but feeble in fact.” 213 As a result, the doctrine is typically considered the
“death knell” of a statute. 214 However, scholarship suggests that in recent years
“strict scrutiny [has become] far from [an] inevitably deadly test.” 215 Thirty
percent of federal cases involving strict scrutiny have upheld the statute at
issue, 216 and in “eleven individual and majority opinions,” the Supreme Court
itself has emphasized that statutes can survive strict scrutiny. 217 The proposed
provision is such a statute. It balances a critical state purpose with the weighty
concerns of the First Amendment to impose only minimal limitations on
protected speech. Furthermore, strict scrutiny exists to oversee these types of
balances and guide legislatures in deciding where to draw the line between

211. As in any criminal case, the jury, after receiving instruction on the law from a judge, will
decide if the government has proven each element of the charged crime and pronounce a verdict. See
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511–15 (1995). However, as demonstrated by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Snyder, should the jury’s conviction violate the First Amendment, a judge can always
set aside the verdict. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. This Comment argues that if a
defendant’s harassing communication satisfies all three elements of the proposed provision, then that
speech should not receive First Amendment protection.
212. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
213. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013).
214. Gresham v. Rutledge, 198 F. Supp. 3d 965, 969 (E.D. Ark. 2016).
215. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006).
216. Id. at 812–13.
217. Ozan O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243, 1247 (2010).
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prohibited and protected communications. 218 Rather than balking at strict
scrutiny’s withering standards, states should welcome the safeguards it provides
and strive to enact a statute that survives its stringent rules.
Accordingly, this section explains how the proposed provision survives
strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires a state to prove that a statute’s restriction
on speech both advances a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. 219 While exacting, the standard is not impossible but rather
presents a challenge that the proposed provision is well suited to meet.
A.

Prohibiting Stalking Communications Advances a Compelling State Interest

The first prong of strict scrutiny requires the state prove that a restriction
advances a compelling state interest. 220 When given the opportunity to decide
whether protecting victims from stalking constituted a compelling state
interest, Shackelford demurred the question and assumed arguendo that the first
prong was met in order to reach the second prong: whether the statute was
narrowly tailored (which it found the law failed). 221 But despite Shackelford’s
silence, the asserted justification behind stalking laws likely rises to the level of
a compelling interest. Both the standards set by the Supreme Court for
determining a compelling interest and the times the Court has actually found a
compelling interest overwhelmingly support the conclusion that preventing
stalking is a compelling state interest.
While the Supreme Court has never provided an express definition of
what constitutes a compelling interest, 222 it has provided several guidelines that
lower courts can use when ascertaining whether a given government interest
satisfies the high standard. For instance, the interest asserted must truthfully
underlie the government’s purpose for passing the statute and not be invented
after the legislation’s passage to survive judicial scrutiny. 223 Stalking laws satisfy

218. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (“[I]t is not rare that a content-based
classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”).
219. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 442 (2015).
220. Id.
221. State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 559, 825 S.E.2d 689, 700 (2019). Shackelford likely
was justified in avoiding the question, due to the principle of constitutional avoidance. See Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Considerations of
propriety . . . [and tradition], demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act
of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the
question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.”).
222. Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and
“Cyberstalking”, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 766 (2013) [hereinafter Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-toMany Speech].
223. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 205 (1975); Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free
Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 912 (1991).
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this requirement due to the well-documented historical evidence that
legislatures adopted stalking laws in direct response to the nation’s growing
awareness of stalking as a problem. 224
In addition to possessing a genuine purpose, the statute must also “identify
an ‘actual problem’ in need of solving.” 225 Once again, a state should have no
trouble meeting this standard. Numerous studies have demonstrated that
stalking is a widespread problem, causing significant physical, mental, and
economic harms to victims. 226
Finally, a state must “demonstrate with clarity that [the statute’s] ‘purpose
or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial.’” 227 Comparing
previous cases where the Supreme Court found a compelling interest to the
motivations underlying stalking laws satisfies this demonstration. A state’s
interest in preventing stalking includes the protection of its citizens, the
preservation of tranquility in their homes, and the prevention of unwanted
communications—interests which the Court has consistently recognized as
important, if not compelling. First, the protection of persons and property is “a
fundamental function of government” and constitutes a compelling interest. 228
Protecting citizens from physical harm lies at the core of a state’s police powers
and is well recognized by the Supreme Court as a legitimate exercise of state
authority. 229 Second, protecting citizens from harassment, particularly in
locations where citizens exercise a reasonable degree of privacy, has also been
upheld as a compelling interest. In Carey v. Brown, 230 the Supreme Court noted
that “[t]he State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy
of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” 231
As a result, the Court has recognized this interest in cases involving targeted
picketing outside of an individual’s home 232 or in residential neighborhoods. 233
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that protecting citizens from
unwanted communications is a legitimate government interest, though perhaps
not by itself a compelling one. 234 However, the interest is strong enough to
224. See supra text accompanying notes 9–12.
225. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (quoting United States v. Playboy
Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 21–28.
227. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 309 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)).
228. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972).
229. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
230. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
231. Id. at 471.
232. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988).
233. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 470–71.
234. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000) (discussing the importance of the right to avoid
unwanted communications but not assigning it a specific level of importance). Ultimately, the case was
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justify regulations prohibiting repeated unwanted mailings 235 and the
distribution of literature on matters of public concern to unwilling recipients. 236
Moreover, the strength of the government’s interest in protecting citizens from
unwanted communications increases as the ability of the recipient to avoid the
speech decreases. 237 Therefore, when all of these interests are combined, the
prohibition of stalking communications that victims have not consented to
receive, put them in danger, and intrude into locations where the victim
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy, presents a compelling
governmental interest, thus satisfying the first prong of strict scrutiny.
B.

Limiting the North Carolina Stalking Statute To Cover Speech That Receives
Less First Amendment Protection Narrowly Tailors the Statute and Further
Justifies Its Survival Under Strict Scrutiny

With the first prong satisfied, the challenge remaining for legislatures to
conquer is drafting a law that is so narrowly tailored that it covers only speech
that the government has a compelling reason to prohibit. Far too often, it is this
prong that proves fatal to otherwise promising statutes. 238 However, the
proposed provision can survive this rigorous examination because each of the
three elements represents an area where the state possesses an enhanced ability
to restrict speech: (1) unwanted one-to-one communications, (2)
communications that invade the listener’s privacy, and (3) communications that
inflict substantial emotional distress. While no single one of these elements is
enough to uphold a content-based restriction, when combined, they create a
narrow and discrete window of speech that captures the precise evil which
stalking laws seek to remedy.
Before examining each of these elements individually, the overall type of
communication that the proposed provision is designed to prohibit needs to be
defined. From a psychological perspective, stalking occurs when an individual
“repeated[ly]” and “persistent[ly]” engages in “unwelcome attempts to approach
or communicate with the victim.” 239 But this definition on its own fails to
capture with sufficient legal specificity why stalking is so problematic. For
instance, this definition covers a constituent who repeatedly mails vitriolic
letters to an elected representative, expressing in colorful and energetic
decided under intermediate scrutiny, which requires a “significant” government interest. See id. at 725–
26; Galloway, supra note 223, at 935.
235. Rowan v. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
236. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 728.
237. Id. at 716.
238. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 878–80, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820–21 (2016) (finding that
protecting children was a compelling interest, but prohibiting social media posts that “intimidate[d] or
torment[ed]” minors was not a narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest).
239. Paul E. Mullen, Michele Pathé, Rosemary Purcell & Geoffrey W. Stuart, Study of Stalkers,
156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1244, 1245 (1999).
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language the constituent’s outrage at the representative’s voting record. Quite
likely, the representative would find these messages “unwelcome,” particularly
if they were “repeated” and “persistent.” 240 But merely communicating one’s
displeasure to an elected official should not support a stalking conviction
because such speech lies at the heart of the First Amendment. 241 Moreover,
when assessing a stalking statute’s constitutionality, courts and critics
frequently look to whether the statute covers political speech—particularly
communications between a constituent and a representative. 242 As a result, a
narrowly tailored statute requires a precise definition that avoids punishing
protected political activity.
But the proposed provision accomplishes that goal. To illustrate, consider
a classic example of stalking communications. In Dugan v. State, 243 the
defendant sent ten unsolicited letters to the victim at her workplace and her
home, requesting sexual photos and describing in lewd language various sexual
actions he wished to engage in with her. 244 Before writing these letters, the
defendant had never spoken to the victim in person and only knew her through
a mutual connection. 245 Moreover, the defendant became aware that the victim
had no desire to receive the letters but continued to write them anyway. 246
When listing what type of communications stalking laws should be able to
prohibit, the ones in Dugan likely sit near the top. If any type of speech exists
from which states can protect their citizens, then it should include Dugan’s
letters—letters that repeatedly arrived at the victim’s home and workplace
containing obscene requests from a complete stranger. The remainder of this
Comment will demonstrate how a state can prohibit these sorts of
communications without endangering First Amendment freedoms.
But before examining how a state can restrict these communications,
briefly note how Dugan corresponds to the proposed provision. In Dugan, the
communication occurred solely between the defendant and the victim, the
defendant had actual knowledge that the victim had no desire to receive the
communications, the defendant directed the communications to a location
where the victim possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the
communications were such that a reasonable person would suffer substantial
240. See In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 853 (Minn. 2019) (postulating this exact
scenario).
241. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (citing Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)) (noting that political speech is “central to the meaning and
purpose of the First Amendment”).
242. See In re A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 853; People v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341, 355–56 (Ill. 2017);
Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct, supra note 83, at 1041–42.
243. 451 P.3d 731 (Wyo. 2019).
244. Id. at 735.
245. See id.
246. See id.
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emotional distress from their receipt. The proposed provision covers exactly the
situation presented in Dugan. Indeed, this Comment will continue to refer to
Dugan throughout this section to help illustrate the proposed provision’s
contours.
1. Unwanted Communications Receive Less First Amendment Protection
The primary principle guiding the proposed provision’s first element is
that states possess an enhanced ability to regulate communications when they
are unwanted. Though broadly protective of free speech as a whole, the
Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to restrict speech imposed upon
an unwilling listener. 247 As stated in Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department, 248 “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling
recipient.” 249 Since its introduction in Rowan, the Court has employed this
doctrine to protect citizens from targeted communications that they have no
desire to receive. The highwater mark arrived in Hill v. Colorado, 250 when the
Court upheld a statute prohibiting any person from coming within eight feet of
a patient on their way to a healthcare facility to communicate with or distribute
literature to the patient without consent. 251 Additional examples include
prohibiting repeated picketing outside of a home in a residential
neighborhood 252 and restricting unwanted mailings. 253
However, Rowan and Hill come with an important qualifier, however: the
unwanted speech must occur between one speaker and one listener. In the
seminal article on the subject, 254 Professor Volokh explained that while one-tomany communications typically receive full First Amendment protection,
unwanted one-to-one communications do not. 255 Modern American life is
replete with restrictions on unwanted one-to-one communications, including
restraining orders, do-not-call lists, and spam mail prohibitions. 256 As
acknowledged by the Supreme Court, these restrictions do not pose the same
dangers as restrictions on one-to-many speech. 257 Unwanted communications
between a single speaker and a single recipient do not advance the goals of
public discourse and the spread of information as much as speech between

247. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 741–43.
248. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
249. Id. at 738.
250. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
251. Id. at 725–27.
252. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988).
253. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
254. See generally Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222 (analyzing the
restrictions on one-to-one speech compared to one-to-many speech).
255. See id. at 740–44.
256. See id. at 740–41.
257. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736–38; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971).
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willing participants. After all, in unwanted communications, the recipient by
definition has no desire to receive the communication and thus is unlikely to
listen to or be influenced by unwanted speech. 258 In contrast, the First
Amendment requires rigorous protection of unwanted one-to-many speech,
particularly when listeners find it offensive, because it empowers minority
groups to submit unpopular views into the public consciousness. 259 Otherwise,
the Supreme Court has warned, governments “[could] silence dissidents simply
as a matter of personal predilections.” 260 This would impose a chilling effect on
speech and effectively close the marketplace of ideas. 261
To avoid chilling protected speech, the proposed provision’s first element
requires that the defendant know that the recipient does not consent to receive
the communications and that the defendant intentionally direct the
communication to a single individual. By limiting the proposed provision’s
reach to a distinct area of lesser-protected speech, this restriction helps narrowly
tailor the proposed provision. To illustrate, consider the defendant’s speech in
Shackelford. Addressed to the world at large and expressing the speaker’s
personal opinions, the social media posts in Shackelford comprised one-to-many,
self-expressive speech—speech that lies at the heart of the First Amendment. 262
Accordingly, a properly limited stalking statute should not have applied to the
defendant’s posts. Looking to the proposed provision, its first element meets
this criterion because it would not implicate the Shackelford defendant’s posts.
The defendant’s posts were one-to-many speech shared on Google Plus for the
entire world to read. They were not directed to an unwilling recipient because
the victim in Shackelford needed to actively seek out the posts herself to discover
their contents. 263 And though a victim might justifiably wish a defendant cease
from posting statements about her online, the First Amendment, as currently
understood, protects such speech. 264 Therefore, by not prohibiting social media
posts disseminated to the world at large, the proposed provision complies with
modern First Amendment jurisprudence and presents a far narrower scope than
the current North Carolina stalking statute.
258. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 743.
259. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
260. Id.
261. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
262. See supra notes 254–61 and accompanying text.
263. See State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 556, 825 S.E.2d 689, 698 (2019). Note, however,
that if the messages had been sent through Google Plus’s instant-messaging tool, it would have been
directed to the victim and thus would have met the first element of the proposed provision. This
distinction is justified by the one-to-many versus one-to-one distinction. While social media posts are
one-to-many speech, which the victim can only view if they send or accept a friend request to or from
the defendant, instant messaging is one-to-one speech that the victim would be notified about without
any action on their part. Because instant messaging, like an email, letter, or phone call, imposes oneto-one speech on an unwilling recipient, it falls within the confines of the proposed provision.
264. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 742–44.
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In contrast, when the proposed provision is applied to classic stalking
behavior, like the situation in Dugan, the narrowly crafted language provides a
tight fit. In Dugan, the defendant directed his graphic letters exclusively to the
victim—they were addressed to her and nobody else could read them without
her sharing their contents. As such, they comprised one-to-one speech.
Moreover, the defendant also knew that the victim did not wish to receive the
letters, satisfying the other half of the proposed provision’s first element. Thus,
the first element of the proposed provision is still broad enough to prohibit
Dugan’s criminal speech.
Comparing how the proposed provision’s first element prohibits the
harassing letters in Dugan but leaves untouched the social media posts in
Shackelford demonstrates how narrowly tailored it is. In doing so, the first
element strikes an appropriate and necessary balance between protecting
victims from harm and respecting defendants’ First Amendment freedoms.
But the first element by itself is not enough. Additional elements are
needed to prevent the proposed provision from extending too far and
entangling constitutionally protected speech. A well-meaning legislature cannot
simply pass a law that bans all speech between one speaker and one listener
when the speaker knows that the listener has no desire to hear it because such a
provision would be overly broad. For instance, it would prohibit
communications between a distressed constituent and their political
representative—one of the most widely recognized forms of constitutionally
protected speech. 265 These communications can occur between one speaker and
one listener and the speaker often is quite aware that the representative has no
desire to hear their speech. But prohibiting these communications would tread
upon the core of protected First Amendment speech. 266 Moreover, stalking laws
are not instituted to prohibit speech between a constituent and representative.
Accordingly, the proposed provision’s first element needs additional limitations
to ensure that it does not encroach on such communications.
In addition, a blanket statute banning all unwanted, one-to-one speech
could cover mailings between a commercial advertiser and a disgruntled citizen
who communicated that they no longer wished to receive any advertisements.
While a state can address this situation through a dedicated spam-mail
statute, 267 it should not fall under the purview of a stalking statute. If a state’s
stalking statute is broad enough to cover a commercial advertisement, it would
likely fail to survive the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny, as well as
potentially succumb to a well-litigated overbreadth challenge. 268
265.
266.
267.
268.
56.

See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
See In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 853 (Minn. 2019).
See Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
See People v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341, 355–56 (Ill. 2017); In re A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 855–
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2. Communications That Intrude into a Location Where a Recipient Enjoys a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Receive Less First Amendment Protection
The second element of the proposed provision helps avoid this danger by
narrowing the North Carolina stalking statute’s reach. Constitutional
restrictions on one-to-one speech typically involve an element of imposition in
addition to being unwanted. In other words, the speech violates the recipient’s
privacy. 269
Take, for example, the seminal case of Cohen v. California. 270 Although the
Supreme Court primarily expanded free speech protections, it still noted that
the “government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into
the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas.” 271 Indeed, a common
thread uniting cases involving unwanted communications is that most of the
speech at issue intruded into the recipient’s private space. 272 Traditionally, this
space was the home—the epicenter of privacy. 273 In recent years, however, the
definition of private space has become more flexible. The private space in Hill,
for example, was one hundred feet around a health care facility. 274 As a whole,
these cases demonstrate that when speech violates a recipient’s privacy, the First
Amendment provides less protection to that intrusive speech. 275
To help implement this principle, the proposed provision adopts a term
from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 276
This phrase originated in Katz v. United States 277 in Justice Harlan’s
concurrence. 278 Now adopted by the Court, 279 the reasonable expectation of
privacy requires: (1) the victim by their conduct to exhibit an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and (2) that society (objectively) be prepared to
recognize the individual’s subjective expectation as reasonable. 280
When applied properly, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
will help narrow the proposed provision’s scope, while still ensuring that victims
269. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 748–49.
270. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
271. Id. at 21.
272. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 748–49.
273. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
274. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708–09 (2000).
275. See, e.g., id. at 716–18; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988); Rowan v. U.S. Post Off.
Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737–38 (1970); see also Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra
note 222, at 748–49 (noting cases where the Supreme Court has allowed restrictions on speech in part
because it “intrud[ed] into the listener's private space”).
276. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
277. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (majority opinion).
278. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy:
Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 914–16
(1997).
279. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018).
280. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
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receive adequate protection. After all, stalking communications primarily reach
victims at locations where they possess a strong expectation of privacy, such as
the home or workplace. 281 One of the most significant harms inflicted by
stalking communications is the loss of the victim’s sense of security, privacy,
and safety in these locations. 282 In this regard, the Katz standard provides a
relatively helpful analog since the Supreme Court has held that citizens possess
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own workplace or home. 283
However, in implementing this cross-application, a court cannot just
robotically import every Fourth Amendment conclusion into the First
Amendment context. What may appear reasonable in one setting, may not be
reasonable in another. For example, under the Katz standard, courts have found
no reasonable expectation of privacy for passengers in a car 284 or items left on
privately owned farmland. 285 While individuals in such situations may not
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy from searches by law enforcement,
they certainly should from harassment by stalkers. 286
More narrow language than “reasonable expectation of privacy” could be
used in the proposed provision—perhaps limiting its reach exclusively to
communications delivered to a victim’s cellphone, work, or home. But such
limiting language would ultimately fail victims by not capturing the varied and
creative ways stalkers may seek to reach them. For instance, the previous list
neglects to mention vehicles, a space where victims possess a strong expectation
of privacy from stalkers. Accordingly, rather than attempting to list every
possible location where a stalker could harass a victim, the wiser course is simply
to prohibit any unwanted one-to-one communications that intrude on spaces
where victims possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. In doing so, the
second element of the proposed provision provides an adequate safeguard

281. See, e.g., State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 546, 825 S.E.2d 689, 693 (2019); State v.
Mazur, 261 N.C. App. 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *2 (2018) (unpublished table
decision) (showing defendant’s stalking occurred right outside plaintiff’s home).
282. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 755–56.
283. See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 40 (2001); United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 852–853 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & SARAH
N. WELLING, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 663 (4th ed. 2010) (examining various applications of
the reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of the home and workplace).
284. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978).
285. United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1156 (4th Cir. 1980).
286. Moreover, unlike in the Fourth Amendment context where a court decides whether the
government violated a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, in the proposed provision’s
application that question will be left to the jury. See supra note 211. A court will only intervene to
determine that a reasonable expectation of privacy did not exist if it was overturning a jury verdict that
violated the First Amendment. This process will reduce the impact of Fourth Amendment case law,
as, in most cases, whether a “reasonable expectation of privacy” existed will depend on the jury’s
opinion, uninfluenced by past precedent.
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against abusive applications of the law, while still remaining flexible enough to
match the variety of situations that arise in the real world.
To illustrate this element’s application, consider the cases of Dugan and
Mazur. In Dugan, the defendant’s harassing letters intruded on the most private
of the victim’s spaces, her home. 287 As such, the situation would clearly satisfy
the reasonable expectation of privacy requirement included in the proposed
provision’s second element. In contrast, the speech at issue in Mazur never
reached a location where the victim would expect to possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy because it never left the defendants’ yard. 288 Therefore,
under the proposed provision, the decorations at issue would never have been
included in evidence during the defendants’ trial. As previously explained, the
speech in Mazur was likely constitutionally protected, since it fell under the
definition of symbolic conduct. 289 And, because the decorations comprised oneto-many speech, punishing the defendants for erecting them would have been
constitutionally problematic. 290 To avoid this problem, the proposed provision’s
second element uses the Supreme Court’s guidelines on restricting speech that
invades privacy to remain narrowly tailored and avoid extending too far into
protected speech.
3. Communications That Cause Substantial Emotional Distress Receive Less
First Amendment Protection
With only the first two elements, the proposed provision still is not
narrowly tailored enough. Consider the situation in Rowan where the
government prohibited unwanted mail. 291 An advertiser who violated that
statute and sent unwanted mail to a recipient’s house would have violated the
first two elements of the statute—directing a communication to a
nonconsenting recipient and directing the communication to a location (the
recipient’s home) where the recipient possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Accordingly, an additional element is needed to ensure that the
proposed provision is adequately limited to only stalking communications,
which raises the question: What separates a merely overenthusiastic advertiser
from a true stalker? The critical difference is that the stalker’s communications
inflict substantial emotional distress upon the victim.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, substantial emotional
distress occurs when a defendant’s “extreme and outrageous conduct” causes

287. Dugan v. State, 451 P.3d 731, 735 (Wyo. 2019).
288. State v. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *3 (2018)
(unpublished table decision) (showing defendant’s stalking occurred right outside plaintiff’s home).
289. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 254–64 and accompanying text.
291. Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737–38 (1970).
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“severe emotional distress to another.” 292 Under this standard, a plaintiff’s
suffering must rise to the level of “such substantial . . . or enduring quality that
no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” 293
When compared to the symptoms of stalking behavior, the tort of substantial
emotional distress presents a striking resemblance. As previously discussed,
stalking results in post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, depression, and
terror, as well as measurable economic effects such as loss of pay from missed
days of work. 294 Furthermore, the fact that stalking statutes were passed
following the public’s awareness of the problem demonstrates that the distress
caused by stalking is one society does not expect victims to endure.
Though the substantial emotional distress tort has fallen out of favor in
recent years, 295 the traditional standard is still available and may even fit better
in the stalking context than elsewhere. Following the Supreme Court’s decision
in Snyder, which reversed the defendants’ convictions for intentionally inflicting
emotional distress because the speech at issue involved a matter of public
concern, 296 state courts began dismissing intentional infliction of emotional
distress cases on First Amendment grounds. 297 But nowhere in Snyder did the
Court strike down the traditional tort. 298 Rather, the Supreme Court left the
tort intact for proper application. Thus, when speech discussing matters of
nonpublic concern causes intentional emotional offense, its punishment does
not offend the First Amendment. 299
While scholars have opposed criminally punishing the infliction of
substantial emotional distress, 300 this Comment does not advocate for
transforming the tort itself into a crime. Rather, the existence of the tort, and
the Supreme Court’s decision to leave it intact, provides important context to
the use of “substantial emotional distress” in the proposed provision. First, it
reveals that speech inflicting substantial emotional distress is yet another
category of speech that the government possesses an enhanced ability to restrict.
While a state could not justify a stalking statute on emotional distress alone,
when combined with the principles underlying the other two elements in the
proposed provision, they work together to further minimize the First

292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
293. Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993)).
294. See supra notes 23–28, 45 and accompanying text.
295. Gordon, supra note 62, at 1.
296. 562 U.S. 443, 458–59 (2011).
297. Gordon, supra note 62, at 1.
298. See id. at 3–4.
299. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451–52 (“Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro
liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private
concern . . . .”).
300. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 788–89.
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Amendment impact of the entire restriction. Second, the background of
substantial emotional distress shows that the term refers to a discrete and welldefined type of speech, one whose impact closely mirrors the impact of stalking.
When considered in conjunction with the other two elements, the substantial
emotional distress element provides additional tailoring to the proposed
provision, further narrowing its breadth.
C.

Putting It All Together

Now that each element of the proposed provision has been detailed, its
usefulness may be further explored by examining how it would apply to the
facts in Mazur and Shackelford. As previously discussed, the communications at
issue in both Mazur and Shackelford are constitutionally protected and thus
should not come within the purview of a properly limited stalking statute. 301
In Mazur, the State presented evidence of the yard decorations, including
the large googly eyes, a frog statue with oversized eyes, and a pig statue with its
butt in the air. 302 However, if the State had proceeded under the properly
limited proposed provision, this evidence would never have been introduced
and the Mazurs’ constitutionally protected speech 303 would have been
uninfringed. The first element of the proposed provision requires the defendant
to direct a communication to a victim who the defendant knows or has reason
to know does not consent to receiving the communication. The Mazurs may
have satisfied this first element since they were intentionally trying to
communicate with their neighbors by using offensive yard ornaments and
decorations. 304 Due to the hostility between the two parties, the Mazurs
certainly knew that the neighbors had not consented to receiving these insults.
Additionally, the messages these symbols attempted to convey—racially
charged insults about the neighbors’ appearance and that the Mazurs were
watching them 305—could foreseeably cause substantial emotional distress to a
reasonable person, satisfying the third element of the proposed provision.
However, the Mazurs’ communications fail to satisfy the second element:
directing communications to reach an individual at a location where they
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. While the neighbors’ home was,
regrettably, directly across from the Mazurs, subjecting them to frequent
viewings of the harassing decorations, the decorations themselves never left the
confines of the Mazurs’ yard. 306 Indeed, the neighbors’ reasonable expectation

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See supra Part II.
See supra notes 107–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107–09, 115–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107–09, 115–17 and accompanying text.
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of privacy could not extend to someone else’s private property. 307 Therefore,
the proposed provision would protect the Mazurs’ constitutional right to display
symbolic decorations on their property, regardless of the message expressed. 308
As for Shackelford, the proposed provision also ensures that the defendant’s
Google Plus posts expressing his feelings for Mary would remain protected.
Like in Mazur, the Shackelford defendant would satisfy part of the first element
since, after being contacted by the pastor, he possessed actual knowledge that
Mary did not wish him to contact her and thus would not consent to receive
any further communications from him. 309 Similarly, the Shackelford defendant
also likely met the third element—inflicting substantial emotional distress—
since a reasonable person would understandably be severely disturbed by having
a total stranger expressing an obsession with them, discussing their future
marriage, attempting to incite their jealousy, and mentioning their family. 310
But, while disturbing, since these social media posts simply expressed the
defendant’s personal feelings to the world at large, they comprise
constitutionally protected speech. 311 They were not directed to Mary, as
required by the first element. Mary had to actively seek out the posts to discover
their content. Accordingly, the proposed provision does not cover these
protected communications.
Furthermore, the second element also ensures that the proposed provision
does not implicate the Shackelford defendant’s posts by restricting the proposed
provision’s reach to speech that intrudes on spaces where a victim possesses a
reasonable expectation of privacy. While Mary may have possessed a reasonable
expectation of privacy to her own instant messaging inbox, 312 she could not
reasonably have extended that same expectation to other individuals’ social
media feeds. In a way, Mr. Shackelford’s social media posts were akin to a
newspaper left on a bench in a public park. While Mary could go to the park,
read the newspaper, and suffer substantial emotional distress from its contents,
she could not successfully argue that its location constituted a private space.
Similarly, Mr. Shackelford’s personal Google Plus content stream, which was
only viewable to those who chose to access it, could not function as a location

307. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has upheld a ban on residential picketing, in part,
due to concerns about the privacy of the home, as well as the issue of the residents being a captive
audience. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1988). However, unlike Frisby, the Mazurs were
not some group of outsiders standing on a public street in front of someone’s home. Rather, they were
homeowners in their own right who erected yard decorations on their own private property, although
living across the street from the victims. Thus, it is unclear how Frisby’s concerns would apply in this
context.
308. See supra notes 254–64 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 263.
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where Mary had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Once again, the second
element of the proposed provision ensures that a defendant’s First Amendment
rights are adequately protected.
IV. POTENTIAL PITFALLS: ADDRESSING SELECT CRITICISMS TO THE
PROPOSED PROVISION
While the proposed provision would ensure that none of the protected
speech in Mazur or Shackelford would incur punishment, it still lies open to a
variety of criticisms. However, when properly construed, the proposed
provision is narrowly tailored enough to survive the most likely objections.
A.

Criticism One: None of the Proffered Principles Alone Justify a Content-Based
Restriction

Starting with the theory underlying the proposed provisions, critics might
note that none of the referenced doctrines alone are sufficient to uphold a
content-based criminal conviction. For instance, the Supreme Court’s decisions
on unwanted one-to-one communications all involved content-neutral
restrictions: Rowan upheld restrictions on all unwanted mailings, regardless of
the message; 313 Frisby v. Schultz 314 upheld restrictions on residential picketing,
regardless of the message; 315 and Hill upheld restrictions on unwanted personal
communications near a health clinic, regardless of the message. 316 Because the
restrictions in these cases were content-neutral, they were not subject to strict
scrutiny. 317 Thus, a critic might contend that cross-applying these contentneutral principles to a content-based restriction misconstrues precedent.
But including a content-based distinction in a stalking statute is
unavoidable. Determining whether a communication should fall under the label
of “stalking” requires a court to examine the content of the message and the
identity of the individual who sent the message—two evaluations that the
Supreme Court has found create a content-based restriction. 318 The state cannot
escape this requirement by simply banning repeated communications regardless
of their content since such a broad law would prove overly inclusive and cover
nonstalking communications like spam mail. 319 Accordingly, some sort of
content-based restriction is necessary to ensure that the law is narrowly tailored
to cover actual stalking behavior. This does not doom the proposed provision,
313. Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
314. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
315. Id. at 488.
316. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 713–14 (2000).
317. See Galloway, supra note 223, at 910–11.
318. See id. at 910 (providing a list of the five types of content-based restrictions recognized by the
Supreme Court).
319. See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
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however. Because the purposes behind stalking laws are so compelling, 320
legislatures can embrace content-based restrictions and the strict scrutiny that
comes with it, provided that the proposed law is sufficiently narrow.
Because the Supreme Court has recognized that states have an enhanced
ability to regulate unwanted one-to-one communications, limiting the statute
to only unwanted one-to-one communications results in a narrowly tailored end
product. Indeed, the same reasoning applies to the other principles—speech
which invades one’s privacy and speech that inflicts substantial emotional
distress also receive less First Amendment protection. While none of these
doctrines standing alone could justify a content-based restriction, together they
represent the intersection of three distinct areas of lesser-protected speech.
When combined, these doctrines outline a narrowly tailored area of speech, one
that resembles the precise type of speech that stalking laws seek to prohibit. 321
Strict scrutiny exists to uphold narrowly tailored laws that advance a compelling
interest and only minimally impact protected speech, even when those laws
create a content-based restriction. 322 Because the proposed provision satisfies
these criterion, it should survive strict scrutiny.
B.

Criticism Two: The Proposed Provision Is Overinclusive

To determine whether a stalking law is overinclusive—in other words,
whether it prohibits an unacceptably wide swathe of constitutionally protected
speech—a court would likely begin with the classic test case: unwanted
communications directed by a constituent to their political representative. 323
But each element of the proposed provision contains language that should
prevent it from applying in such a case.
First, element one requires the constituent to know that the representative
did not consent to the communication. Yet, in running for elected office, the
representative places themself in a position to receive communications decrying
their voting record and expressing opposing views on political matters. 324
Accordingly, constructive consent exists for constituents to send their
representative communications containing the constituents’ opinions on the
representative’s performance. 325 And while the representative can choose not to
open the offensive letters, constructive consent to receiving such letters exists

320. See supra notes 220–37 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Section III.B.
322. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982).
323. See supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
324. See In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 853 (Minn. 2019); People v. Relerford, 104
N.E.3d 341, 355–56 (Ill. 2017); Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at
744–45.
325. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 744–45.
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until the moment a representative leaves office. 326 Therefore, the first element
alone prevents the proposed provision from violating the classic test.
But element two provides even more protection. In order to violate
element two, a constituent would have to direct the communications to a space
where the representative possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy. As long
as the constituent is using legal means to express their disagreement with a
representative, they will not violate this rule. After all, representatives cannot
reasonably expect to have a level of privacy that prevents receipt of most
constituent communications; receiving communications from constituents lies
at the core of an elected official’s responsibilities. However, if the constituent’s
actions somehow go beyond the representative’s public life, and intrude into
truly personal areas, such as persistently calling the cellphone of the
representative’s teenage daughter, the representative and his daughter should
receive the same protection as any other citizen who suffers from dangerous
stalking behavior. Current First Amendment jurisprudence does not hold
otherwise. 327
Finally, element three imposes an additional burden on representatives
accusing a constituent of sending stalking communications—the representative
must prove that the communications were likely to cause substantial emotional
harm. The test to determine “substantial emotional harm” asks whether the
communications were so extreme that they exceeded all bounds that society
usually tolerates. 328 As a society, the United States tends to extend a high degree
of tolerance toward political speech, regardless of how distasteful it may be. 329
After all, the marketplace of ideas theory, which undergirds modern First
Amendment jurisprudence, 330 requires society to tolerate all sides of a debate in
order to arrive at the truth. 331 While modern political polarization may have
326. Of course, this does not mean that a political candidate must consent to receiving the most
extreme forms of speech. The First Amendment does not require representatives submit to threats or
harassing telephone calls to their home. See id. But, in the majority of situations, representatives
are likely unable to decline receipt of directed one-to-one speech from political opponents. For
example, politicians who have tried to block detractors on Twitter have not been successful.
Can Elected Officials Block Critics on Their Social Media Pages?, FIRST AMEND. WATCH,
https://firstamendmentwatch.org/deep-dive/can-elected-officials-block-critics-on-their-social-mediapages/ [https://perma.cc/E4NJ-M5DY] (last updated Mar. 24, 2020).
327. See, e.g., Hott v. State, 400 N.E.2d 206, 207–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding a defendant’s
conviction for inflicting vulgarity-filled late-night calls to the homes of the chief of police and the
prosecutor).
328. See Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009).
329. See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 744–45.
330. Hilary Schronce Blackwood, Regulating Student Cyberbullying, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 153, 173–
75 (2012–2013).
331. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas[,] . . . the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and . . . truth is the only ground
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damaged this ideal, 332 the Supreme Court has remained steadfast in extending
First Amendment protections to even the most outrageous of expressions. 333
Hence, a prosecutor would struggle to prove that a defendant’s expression of
their political views to an elected official was outside the bounds of what society
tolerates, particularly when such an argument contradicts the entire theory
predicating modern First Amendment jurisprudence.
Now, certainly, an extreme situation could arise that warrants an exception
to this principle. 334 If a constituent’s actions expanded so far beyond mere
political communication that they satisfied all three elements of the proposed
provision, then they should fall under the stalking statute. And courts have
upheld convictions on extreme constituent communications in the past. 335 In
such a case, however, the constituent would have left the marketplace of ideas
far behind and instead be engaging in truly dangerous stalking behavior.
Limiting such speech does not pose a significant threat to democratic
governance or the search for truth. But, generally, for most political
communications, the third element would provide strong protection, especially
when combined with the limits in the first two elements.
C.

Criticism Three: The Proposed Provision Is Underinclusive

In contrast to the previous allegation, a critic might also suggest that the
proposed provision is underinclusive because it does not cover three relevant
situations that routinely occur in stalking cases: (1) the stalker sends food
deliveries or other gifts to a victim’s home, work, or other private location; (2)
the stalker posts compromising photos of the victim on the internet; or (3) the
stalker intercepts the victim at a public location where the victim could not
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy because, due to the public nature
upon which [people’s] wishes safely can be carried out.”); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 881–82 (1963).
332. See EMILY EKINS, CATO INST., THE STATE OF FREE SPEECH AND TOLERANCE IN
AMERICA: ATTITUDES ABOUT FREE SPEECH, CAMPUS SPEECH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AND
TOLERANCE OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION 25 (2017), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/surveyreports/pdf/the-state-of-free-speech-and-tolerance.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y92K-8ZCC] (noting that
a large percentage of citizens feel the need to censor themselves); Max Boot, Conservatives
Have a ‘Cancel Culture’ of Their Own, WASH. POST (July 10, 2020, 10:24 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/10/conservatives-have-cancel-culture-their-own/
[https://perma.cc/ECX5-38JV (dark archive)] (describing attempts by the left and the right to silence
speech they do not agree with).
333. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019) (reversing the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office’s decision to deny a copyright to the brand “Fuct” because it “disfavors certain ideas”); Matal v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (allowing a band to copyright a racial slur as their name because
“[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend”); Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (protecting Westboro Baptist Church’s ability to conduct a vitriolic protest at
a U.S. service member’s funeral).
334. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
335. Id.

99 N.C. L REV. 479 (2021)

524

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

of the location, any individual might choose to go there. 336 However, each of
these actions can be remedied through laws that do not implicate First
Amendment rights and thus need not be addressed by the proposed provision.
In the first situation, gifts delivered without any other expressive meaning
do not contain sufficient communicative aspects to transform them into
protected speech. As the Shackelford court noted, the defendant’s mere delivery
of cupcakes to the victim did not comprise First Amendment activity as it
included no communicative aspects. 337 Thus, a state can prohibit such deliveries
without infringing upon free speech, and a proposed provision dedicated solely
to prohibiting stalking communications need not address this situation.
As for the second situation, where a harasser posts compromising photos
of a victim on the internet (commonly referred to as revenge porn), it too should
not fall under an anti-stalking statute. While revenge porn perpetrators often
possess similar motivations to stalking defendants, their actions are distinct.
Therefore, even though the government likely can prohibit revenge porn
without violating the First Amendment, 338 it should not attempt to do so under
the same statute that prohibits stalking communications. After all, the broader
a statute, the less likely it is to be narrowly tailored and the greater the
likelihood it fails constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, the wisest solution is to
write two different laws, one for revenge porn and one for stalking
communications, rather than creating a bloated, catch-all statute for both.
Finally, in the third situation, a state can prohibit a stalker from
continually following a victim. 339 Once again, such a restriction concerns only
physical activity and presents no First Amendment problems. Indeed, such a
regulation applies regardless of whether the location is a public or private place
and whether the defendant speaks to the victim or not. As a result, while such
a restriction should be included in any adequate stalking statute, it does not
belong in a provision specifically focused on communicative activities.
D.

Criticism Four: The Proposed Provision Includes One-to-Many Speech

Another criticism is that the proposed provision covers one-to-many
speech, while Volokh’s theory limits itself to one-to-one speech. 340 After all, the
provision only requires that the speech be directed to an individual, not that the
speech be exclusively received by the individual. One could easily imagine a
situation where a defendant directs communication to a victim, but in such a
way that third parties can also witness the harassing communications. Indeed,

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Mullen et al., supra note 239, at 1245–46.
State v. Shackelford, 264 N.C. App. 542, 561, 825 S.E.2d 689, 701 (2019).
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
Guy, supra note 15, at 992–93.
See Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 222, at 738–39.
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that is exactly what occurred in Mazur. 341 Thus, a critic could argue that by
allowing the statute to potentially include one-to-many speech, the proposed
provision sweeps too broadly and implicates speech involved in persuasion,
debate, and the marketplace of ideas—speech that the First Amendment
vigorously protects. 342
This critique, however, suffers from two fatal flaws. First, requiring that
the victim alone receive the communication could frustrate the purpose of
stalking legislation. Under such a regime, a defendant could escape all
consequences by simply ensuring that, in addition to the victim, some third
party also witnessed the distressing communication. Second, because the statute
only applies to communications that the defendant directs to a location where
the recipient enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as home or
work, 343 the likelihood of third parties also receiving that same communication
is small. In situations where third parties are likely to witness the
communication, such as the neighborhood street in Mazur, the victim, in
contrast, is unlikely to possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed, the
decorations in Mazur do not fall under the proposed provision’s scope precisely
because the victim would have possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy
toward decorations placed on another’s lawn. 344
Furthermore, the problem of a third party being present also existed in
cases where the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on unwanted speech. In
Rowan, for instance, a third party visiting a victim could have easily viewed an
unwanted mailing that was opened by the victim in the third party’s presence,
but the existence of such a hypothetical situation never entered the Court’s
analysis. 345 So too could third parties have accompanied a nonconsenting
patient in Hill and thus have been denied access to information presented by a
protestor within one hundred feet around a healthcare facility. 346 Again, the
Court took no notice of such a scenario. Instead, both cases focused on to whom
the communication was primarily directed. If courts reviewing the proposed
provision adopt a similarly reasonable perspective, then they should have no
difficulty in finding that the proposed provision is sufficiently limited.
That does not mean victims lack all protection from severely emotionally
disturbing speech that is broadcast to the world. It just means that, in general,
instances of hurtful one-to-many speech do not comprise classic stalking

341. State v. Mazur, 261 N.C. App. 538, 817 S.E.2d 919, 2018 WL 4440576, at *2–3 (2018)
(unpublished table decision).
342. See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Section III.B.2.
344. See supra Section III.B.2.
345. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737–38 (1970).
346. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708–09 (2000).
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behavior. Take for instance Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 347 where Falwell, a
prominent evangelical pastor, sued a tabloid for defamation after it published a
satirical article describing him having “a drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse.” 348 This article was an example of one-to-many
speech that severely disturbed Falwell. However, the appropriate legal remedy
was not a stalking law; it was defamation—albeit, an unavailable remedy in that
particular case because of Falwell’s status as a public figure. 349 But the fact
remains that victims have ways to protect themselves from unwanted,
emotionally disturbing one-to-many speech, it simply should not come from
stalking statutes.
CONCLUSION
Today, courts and legislatures struggle to find the appropriate balance to
strike when prohibiting stalking communications. On one side of the divide
stand millions of victims who require the state’s help to adequately protect
themselves from genuine and serious harm. On the other side is the defendants’
right to free speech, a right that lies at the heart of our nation’s Constitution.
While difficult, this dilemma need not prove impossible. By limiting stalking
laws to cover only unwanted communications directed by a defendant to a
victim that violate the victim’s expectation of privacy and place the victim in
substantial emotional distress, legislatures can enact a statute that complies with
established First Amendment principles. Moreover, the precise contours
created by these principles will allow courts to find that the statute survives
strict scrutiny because its narrowly tailored restrictions advance a compelling
state interest: protecting citizens from harassment and harm. Ultimately, by
finding a way to achieve the state’s critical objectives while still complying with
existing precedential boundaries, the proposed provision invokes the Supreme
Court’s timeless admonishment that though “the Constitution protects against
invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.” 350
NATHAN W. WILSON **
347. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
348. Id. at 47–48.
349. Id. at 50.
350. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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